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Abstract 
The housing crisis in Cairo, Egypt is a “wicked problem” that has stumped planners and 
built environment professionals for decades. Cairo’s 20 million residents are engaged in an 
everyday struggle for space, particularly housing. The current housing stock does not respond 
to the residents’ everyday needs. Overpopulation and lack of affordable housing has resulted in 
residents squatting and self-building housing. My research centers around one such “informal” 
settlement called the City of the Dead (COD). A series of cemeteries located in Cairo’s city 
center, COD is home to many of Cairo’s poor and rural migrants. Planning efforts such as the 
Masterplan Cairo 2050 outline intentions to evict these residents, without details on their 
rehabilitation. Standing between decision makers and new or modified development, are 
embedded place narratives that cannot be erased. Narratives hold power to shape, change, and 
ignore what already exists. This thesis explores the narratives about the City of the Dead that 
are ignored in Masterplan Cairo 2050. Using qualitative methods, I focus on unpacking these 
narratives about COD, held by major stakeholders such as government officials, urban 
planners, popular media, and other sources, in order to elucidate how these, determine the 
negative planning outcomes proposed in policy documents. Based in the analysis of primary 
and supplementary data, I unpack the dominant narrative based in themes around legality, 
relocation, services, historical and cultural aspects, urban fabric, planning and governance. 
Through this in-depth analysis of themes and terminology used by respondents, I show that the 
dominant narrative about COD imagines it to be a cemetery and not a residential settlement. 
Also, evident in the plans and policies pertaining to COD, and in the terminology used to 
describe those who live in COD, this dominant narrative ignores the value that COD brings as a 
place to live to its residents.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The Problem 
Cairo, Egypt is the largest city in the Middle East by population, and it is a notable 
cultural and political hub (Sims, 2003). Population rates have only increased in the last few 
decades causing continuous urbanization (Soliman & De Soto, 2003). It is admittedly difficult to 
make policies and plans that cater to the housing needs of the Greater Cairo Region’s (GCR) 20 
million inhabitants, but it is the state’s responsibility no less. In GCR there exists both a surplus 
of vacant homes that were built for the wealthy1 by the private sector and by individuals (Fahmi 
& Sutton, 2008) and a lack of affordable housing across multiple socio-economic levels, but 
particularly for middle to no-income residents. As a result, there is an ongoing need for informal 
housing in Cairo, Egypt. In other words, informal housing is needed because the formal housing 
stock in Cairo does not match the needs of those who live there. This work looks at one such 
housing settlement called The City of the Dead (COD). COD is made up of a series of 
cemeteries that serve as a formal2 burial site for the dead and a fully functioning informal 
community for the living (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). Cemeteries in COD are dissimilar to traditional 
cemeteries found in the United States, for example, in that they are not made up of burial plots 
six feet deep with grave markers surrounded by green space (Soliman, 2015). Rather, the 
majority of burial sites consist of permanent, above ground structures surrounded by courtyards. 
Many of the built structures in COD have become temporary or permanent homes for much of 
Cairo’s urban poor and rural migrants (Nedoroscik, 1997).  It is perceived by some that informal 
settlements are a result of the city being overpopulated by “peasants” (Bayat & Denis, 2000, p. 
185). Partially in response to this narrative, Masterplan Cairo 2050 was drafted in 2007-08 
(Tarbush, 2012). The plan proposed demolishing many places of informal housing including the 
City of the Dead (Tozzi Di Marco, 2011). Demolition would first require eviction and relocation of 
informal residents to “new housing extensions” in the desert (Tarbush, 2012, p.176), yet Cairo 
2050 is scant on details about this process. Though Cairo 2050 is no longer the “official” plan, 
much of the logic and intent behind it is evident in current planning documents (Tadamun, 
2014). Because the narratives held by major stakeholders do not imagine COD to be a place to 
 
1 It should be noted that vacant self-built informal housing units have emerged in Cairo, particularly in the last 
decade. This can be attributed to the building process becoming too expensive and/or an expectation that those 
living in the unit would pay a higher rent to the speculator-owners as time goes on (Fahmi & Sutton, 2008).  
2 The word formal here has a dual meaning. Formal as in the cemetery is a proper burial site for the dead and 
formal as in the cemetery was formally planned 
2 
live, the site is still up for demolition.  This work will explore the narratives about the City of the 
Dead held by major stakeholders, popular media, and other sources that have led to negative 
planning outcomes, such as demolition, proposed in policy documents like Cairo 2050. 
Demolition for COD is problematic because it has served as a home for three generations of 
Egyptians (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). As Cairo’s population continues to grow, there is need for an 
affordable housing stock to accommodate all residents, but this does not exist. 
Research Question 
How do particular narratives of the City of the Dead affect the current occupation3 and 
the future planning surrounding this place?  
Significance of Work 
The scholarly intentions of this work closely align with the Egyptian-German Participatory 
Development Programme study (Howeidy et al., 2009). The Egyptian-German Participatory 
Development Programme study unpacks the complexities of informality by providing perspective 
from multiple stakeholders invested in the livelihood of multiple informal settlements in Egypt. 
My work focuses more narrowly on stakeholder narratives regarding only one informal 
settlement in Cairo: The City of the Dead. This contributes to the body of urban planning 
research because little is known about cemeteries as informal settlements globally. This 
research ties together the ideas of Robert A. Beauregard from his chapter in Site Matters. His 
chapter titled “From Place to Site: Negotiating Narrative Complexity” reveals the powerful truth 
that before urban planners and designers take action, narratives on the sites in which they hope 
to act are embedded place narratives that cannot be erased. This thesis explores the narratives 
about the City of the Dead that will be ignored if the current plans for the site come to fruition. 
Narratives hold power - power to shape, change, and ignore what already exists. Any profession 
that deals with power structures will benefit from understanding how powerful interests can 
shape the way people see and understand a particular situation or place. Planning is a multi-
faceted practice that leaves lasting social and physical impacts on communities. This work will 
inform my own profession and others’ on how narratives ultimately lead to decision making. This 
work contemplates a series of questions to allow the reader to explore the larger social issues at 
hand that go beyond the topic of housing or narrative. Questions addressed in this work are: 
 
3 The word occupation here refers to people occupying, or living in, a space. This word is not intended to have a 
negative connotation or imply that people are ‘invading’ COD 
3 
Whose responsibility it is to provide affordable housing - the government or the resident? Why 
would someone willingly live in a cemetery? How does the presence of residents help the City of 
the Dead in terms of legality? How does terminology shape narrative? How do powerful 
interests shape narrative? How might planning for COD be reorganized to reduce power 
imbalances? Whose responsibility it is to provide infrastructure and urban services- the 
government or the resident?  
Background 
Urban Informality 
Urban informality was first defined in literature in the 1970s (Perlman, 1976; Roy & 
AlSayyad, 2004) and is a term that encompasses many ‘irregular’ systems that enable 
communities to function. Subsets of an informal system include informal economies, services, 
social networks, and housing. This research focuses primarily on informal housing, or informal 
settlements.  Formal housing is in most cases, characterized by legal methods of urbanization, 
whereas informal housing is created in a number of ways. In the Egyptian context, informal 
housing4 is deemed as such if the government refuses to issue a building permit or there are no 
subdivision plans for a particular area (Sims, 2003). To put it plainly, informal settlements are 
any housing settlements that are not ‘formal.’ According to Ananya Roy, “Informal housing is a 
distinctive type of market where affordability accrues through the absence of formal planning 
and regulation” (Roy, 2005, p.149). Informal settlements have been constructed on agricultural 
lands, rural lands, urban areas, and in vacant development. During the beginning stages of 
informal settling, asphalt, road lighting, water, and sewage are completely missing (Osman, 
Divigalpitiya, Osman, Kenawy, Salem, & Hamdy, 2016). Over time, some of these necessities 
are added to the development to make it more livable (Osman, et al., 2016). There is a 
spectrum of variance between informal settlements (Abrams, 1966; Loftus-Farren, Z., 2011) and 
a squatter settlement or slum, is one type of informal settlement. The catch-all word ‘slum’ does 
not fully express the differences between one type of slum from another.  
While slums are largely associated with the megacities of the global South, slums exist 
in both the global South and global North. There exists incredible variance among slums, as 
some slums are rented while others are owner-occupied. Some are legal while others are 
 
4This definition has been narrowed by Egyptian lawmakers in recent years and will be discussed further in an 
upcoming section 
4 
illegal. Some slums are in the middle of a city, and some are on agricultural lands. Slums vary in 
height, size, and livability (Abrams, 1966). Some slums are self-built while others are not. One 
area within a particular slum can have adequate access to urban services and infrastructure 
while an area within the same slum can be without. A city can have multiple slum areas that 
vary in desirability among low income residents. One slum in Cairo, for example, might be a 
‘better’ or more socially acceptable place to live than the nearby slum neighborhood also in 
Cairo. Another type of informal settlement is the tent city - which exists in the United States 
(Loftus-Farren, Z., 2011). A tent city in Chicago, Illinois can be aided with support from nonprofit 
groups, churches, and schools while the same type of informal settlement, a tent city, in 
Portland, Oregon may not receive similar support (Loftus-Farren, Z., 2011).  
Informal Housing as a Result of Lack of Affordable Housing  
The reason informal housing exists in society is as nuanced as the settlements 
themselves. Informal housing as a subject, has been widely explored in academic literature 
(Moser, 1994) and researchers have different speculations on why informality exists based on 
their background or field of study. Poverty, lack of consistent income, rural to urban migration, 
and the lack of affordable housing options are some reasons for housing informality (Maher, 
2017). In the case of Egypt, the lack of affordable housing stock is the biggest contributor to 
informal housing, though all of the reasons above intersect at some point. Even the cheapest 
place to live in the ‘formal’ sector is so expensive that low income urban residents have to find 
vacant land or underutilized development, in or around cities, to live in (Osman, et al., 2016; 
Perlman, 1976).  
Housing affordability has two key components: the household’s income and the housing 
cost (Ahmed, Khalifa, & Abdel, 2017). UN-Habitat defined affordable housing in 2010 as, “A 
housing expenditure that represents no more than 30 percent of the household income” (Ahmed 
et al., 2017, p.1). If the housing cost is greater than 30 percent, the household may not have 
enough money to spend on non-housing needs. Though 30 percent is widely accepted 
measurement, there is not a universally accepted method of calculating housing affordability 
(Ahmed et al., 2017). On a broader scale, housing affordability is affected by factors such as 
regional economic development, fiscal and monetary policies, and urban planning agendas, as 
well as quality, quantity and availability of housing stock (Tiwari & Hingorani, 2013; Yates & 
5 
Milligan, 2007). All of these factors are ultimately regulated by the state5 and should require 
proper attention. As countries continue to urbanize (Moser, 1994; Perlman, 1976) affordable 
housing provision has not kept pace with migration rates globally (Tiwari & Hingorani, 2013). As 
a result, informal settlements are a current and future urban reality (Abrams, 1966; Billig, 2011). 
Migration rates directly affect the quantity of affordable housing necessary to service a particular 
area. Without access to affordable housing, migrants turn to informal housing to meet their 
needs. Asef Bayat, a prominent Iranian scholar who has written and taught extensively on 
informal urban space in the Middle East, gives the following account on why migrants found 
informal housing as their best option: 
“Since the 1950s hundreds of thousands of poor families have been part of a long and 
steady migration from Iran's villages and small towns to its big cities, some seeking to 
improve their lives, some simply trying to survive. Many of them settled quietly, 
individually or more often with their kin members, on unused urban lands or/and cheap 
purchased plots largely on the margin of urban centres. To escape from dealing with 
private landlords, unaffordable rent and overcrowding, they put up their shelters in 
illegally established sites with their own hands or with the help of relatives” (Bayat, 
1997, p.53).  
Though it was not listed as the sole reason, lack of affordable housing plays a role in 
migrants living informally in Iran. While Bayat, in this instance, focusses on Iran, the phenomena 
he describes is not unique to Iran. Across the world, rapid urbanization, and lack of affordable 
housing has pushed new migrants and low-income urban residents into informal housing which 
often involves self-construction on squatted land or adaptive reuse of existing disused 
structures. 
Narratives of Informality 
In the same way reasons for informality vary, so too do narratives about informal 
settlements. Generally speaking, the literature on informal settlements can be divided into two 
dominant narratives: problematic and hopeful. Scholars call out the fact that there are two 
dominating narratives of informal housing (Roy, 2005; O’Donnell, 2010).  
 
5 The state is an institution where the powers of a city are concentrated, such as the military or police. There are 
two types of states: authoritarian and democratic (Chen, Orum, & Paulsen, 2018). 
6 
The problematic narrative imagines informal settlements as grim areas of concentrated 
poverty that must be eradicated. Slums of today are exclusively for the poorest and most 
vulnerable. Because of unanticipated economic change, slums exist (Davis, 2006). Davis 
acknowledges that others hold a narrative about slums that imagines them to be a result of “bad 
governance”. Davis does not see this as a complete narrative because it does not take into 
account land use issues that arise from “super-urbanization” such as sprawl, urban hazards, 
and environmental degradation (2004). In short, Davis sees slums as both the result of 
economic crisis and as crises themselves. Along the lines of Davis’s work, scholars Hall & 
Pfeiffer believe that informal settlers build their communities without any regard for laws or 
planning regulations. Additionally, these scholars do not hold the state responsible in any way 
for the development of and need for informal settlements (Hall & Pfeiffer, 2000). Charles Stokes 
sets up his 1962 article by “assuming that slums do have a function in the development of the 
city” (p. 187). However, that role is later described as possibly cancerous (Stokes, 1962). In the 
same way cancer cells reproduce and ultimately kill their host, so too do slums of cities. Stokes 
does acknowledge that the cancer analogy breaks down, as slums are sometimes necessary 
and even helpful components of cities. Nevertheless, Stokes states that slums are home to “the 
poor and the stranger” (1962, p.188). His ultimate desire for informal settlers is to see them 
formalized or integrated into the rest of formal city life. In other words, he sees slums as merely 
a helpful tool for social mobility. If slums are not being used for this purpose and eventually 
eradicated, he is anti-slums. 
In a work that explores the narratives of two informal settlements in the megacity6 
Dhaka, Bangladesh, scholars Fattah and Walters carefully articulate how this narrative of grim, 
concentrated poverty regarding informal settlements creates a stigma against such settlements 
resulting in those residents becoming the “other” of society.  
“Discourses of vilification consisting of deeply discrediting narratives that circulate in 
political, bureaucratic and journalistic fields produce the dominant imaginings of urban 
poor neighbourhoods (Butler, 2019; Parker & Karner, 2010; Wacquant, 2008). Such 
narratives portray informal settlement residents as undesirable in the city, and 
systematically exclude them from essential urban amenities and opportunities including 
access to employment, education, and medical care (Keene & Padilla, 2014). Through 
 
6 Megacities are thought to be large, chaotic cities located in the global South. Megacities are deemed essentially 
powerless in comparison to Global Cities found in the global North (Roy, 2005). 
7 
territorial stigmatisation informal settlement residents become an “obnoxious and 
repugnant other, always underserving and tainted” (Auyero, 1999, p. 65), an out-of-place 
population to be removed from the city” (Fattah & Walters, p. 55-56) 
This type of discourse influences both policy makers and urban planners. This, in turn, 
affects ordinary people’s narrative of ‘informals’ and their settlements.  
 A more hopeful narrative discusses informal settlements as an opportunity for 
both the city and informal residents (Abrams, 1966; Turner, 1968). Abrams underscores housing 
informality as a way to successfully accommodate the poor in the midst of formal housing 
pressures and instabilities (Abrams, 1996). Abrams and Turner are most notable for drawing 
this conclusion for counties in developing and industrializing countries (Billig, 2011). Hernando 
de Soto is perhaps best known for his opinion of slums being a form of “heroic 
entrepreneurship” (2000). He argues that ‘informals’ are making the best out of an economic 
system that excludes them by championing one of their very own. He draws attention to the fact 
that while informal settlers often avoid taxes and regulations that the formal market requires, 
they endure different hidden and hard-hitting costs. Unlike Hall & Pfeiffer, De Soto offers a 
narrative that informality is a response to inefficient state regulations pertaining to housing and 
economic markets. Scholar Ananya Roy remarks De Soto’s neoliberal position regarding 
property rights in that De Soto believes ‘informals’ should be granted the right to property rights, 
but not property rights outright (Roy, 2004) Other scholars such as Ahmed Soliman and 
Hernando De Soto (2003) have pointed out that certain types of informality are more socially 
acceptable than others, while other scholars attempt to clear the myths of marginally regarding 
three different types of informal settlements in Brazil and the types of settlers within. Perlman’s 
work even traces how the widely held myths helped produce government policies that were ill-
fitting for both ‘informals’ and the nation at large (Perlman, 1976). Perhaps one of the most 
articulate narratives regarding urban informality points out that no matter which camp a scholar 
falls under (i.e a narrative of crisis or hope) he or she images the informal sector as one 
completely separate from the formal, and this is not accurate (Roy, 2005). Both are dependent 
upon the other.  
My research focuses on the narrative of one particular informal settlement in Cairo, 
Egypt called the City of the Dead. For this research, narrative is defined as a story or 
representation of a particular place (Beauregard, 2005). Built environment professionals are 
interested in narrative as told by two authors: the place itself and the people who interact with it. 
8 
In other words, they focus on two main questions: what does a place say it intrinsically is and 
what do people say a place intrinsically is? All places have numerous attached narratives. 
Those narratives compete for dominance surrounding the same place (Beauregard, 2005). 
People in positions of power such as decision makers, public officials, politicians, educators and 
the media, have the power to determine the dominant narrative about a place and in the 
process shape other people’s narratives. Narratives shape understanding and discourse, which 
determine how we plan for something. As an example, if the dominant narrative surrounding a 
particular formal housing development is that it serves residents well and also contributes to 
create a cohesive urban fabric, this narrative will inform understanding of the development for 
the general public and the decision makers, as a desirable place to live. This will in turn 
incentivize as well as provide residents with the agency to ask for better service provision for the 
neighborhood. Broken infrastructure will be quickly repaired, and surrounding development will 
cater to the needs of this community. Ultimately, it will be treated as a place to live by all. 
Conversely, if the dominant narrative surrounding a particular informal housing settlement is that 
it is a health hazard occupied by criminals, this narrative will inform an understanding of the 
settlement as an undesirable place to live. Even worse, it could not be defined as a place to live 
at all. As is the case for the City of the Dead7. The City of the Dead is made up of multiple 
cemeteries that lie on the eastern side of the Greater Cairo Region (GCR). It is a formal burial 
site for the dead and a fully functioning informal community for the living (Fahmi & Sutton, 
2014). The City of the Dead is unique in that, in the Egyptian context, it does not fit under the 
new definition of informal housing. Informal housing, what has been commonly referred to as 
ashwaiyyat8 in the literature, is now spilt into two categories: unplanned and unsafe. The 
definition of ashwaiyyat now includes only those settlements that are physically “unsafe” 
according to Egyptian law makers - specifically Egypt’s Informal Settlements Development Fund 
(ISDF) (Shakran, 2016; Ezz, 2018). This change in definition is directly tied to funding, as the 
cabinet specified in 2008 that monetary support would only go to settlements that fit the new 
definition. Only a small percentage of the total informal settlements in Egypt are “unsafe” 
(Howeidy et al., 2009, p.180). It is important to note that while planning documents refer to COD 
 
7 The City of the Dead is also called al-Qarafa or Maqabar, meaning ‘cemetery’ in Egyptian-Arabic (Tozzi Di Marco, 
2011) 
8 Arabic word Ashwaiyyat - the plural for ashwaiyya literally meaning ‘random’ or ‘haphazard’ (Bayat & Denis, 
2000)  
9 
as an “unplanned” informal area, powerful interests do not define the City of the Dead as 
informal housing because cemeteries are not inherently housing.  
 While I am aware of the distinction Egypt’s government has made in terminology, 
I disagree with it - and so does the academic literature on informal housing. I argue in my 
conclusions that the Egyptian definition hinders the planning process for the City of the Dead. I 
use terms ‘informal settlement’ and ‘informal housing settlement’ when describing the COD. I 
say people ‘live’ ‘reside’ and are ‘residents’ of COD. Though COD is a slum according to 
literature, I choose not to use this word in my writing when describing the City of the Dead 
because of its ambiguity and negative connotations9. In short, it is my position that the City of 
the Dead is an informal settlement and a place to live.   
In the following sections, I discuss other relevant topics such as: cemetery planning, 
Cairo’s urban planning efforts, Egypt’s government and affordable housing, “Solutions” for 
Upgrading Informal Housing, and Cairo’s housing stock including the City of the Dead.   
Cemetery Planning  
The way society buries the deceased has historically been determined by religion, 
superstition, and a concern for public health (Lehrer, 1974). Though problems involving 
cemeteries are not common, the seemingly permanent nature of a cemetery makes decisions 
concerning it unusually weighty (Cemeteries in the City Plan, 1950; Goodman & Freund, 1968). 
Yet, few published planning documents include a separate section for cemetery land use 
(Cemeteries in the City Plan, 1950). For example, cemetery planning is not even mentioned in 
Egypt’s official 2008 housing and construction law document (Soliman, 2015). The lack of 
cemetery planning is seen when families illegally create private family cemeteries instead of 
using public cemeteries in Egypt. Families also claim areas within public cemeteries and 
construct tombs to assert their ownership of a particular area. Lastly, government officials 
acquire plots using their family member’s and children’s names for the purpose of selling these 
at a higher price at a time when the plot is worth more money due to greater demand. This 
falsely creates a demand for more cemetery space in Egypt (Soliman, 2015). The urban planner 
will always be faced with challenges to find sufficient land to be allocated for the dead (Lehrer, 
1974). Many writers on the subject have suggested residential areas are more suitable for 
 
9  See Gilbert, 2007 for more on the negative connotations of the word ‘slum’  
 
10 
cemetery development (Cemeteries in the City Plan, 1950; Bassett, 1937; Lehrer, 1974). 
However, this is not preferred in the Egyptian or Middle Eastern context (Soliman, 2015). It is 
common for cemeteries to be placed in areas that are considered to be too close to urban 
settlements (Soliman, 2015). While this might be true, not all cemeteries in Egypt were 
haphazardly built too close to urban settlements. “Older cemeteries were built on sites which 
were, at that time, on the outskirts of the metropolitan area, but now are within the inner core of 
the city” (Lehrer, 1974, p.188-189), as is the case for the City of the Dead.  
Cemetery Removal  
Planners are perhaps more troubled by pre-existing cemeteries than determining the 
location of new ones (Lehrer, 1974). This is because development continues to grow around a 
cemetery, making the cemetery no longer the ‘highest and best use’10 of that land. This is more 
likely to be the case for a cemetery that is old and neglected. Cemeteries can be rehabilitated, 
but if those efforts are not sustainable, cemeteries can be demolished or relocated (Cemeteries 
in the City Plan, 1950). In the United States specifically, cemetery removal can be justified if the 
site is legally considered to be a ‘nuisance’11 (Cemeteries in the City Plan, 1950; Lehrer, 1974).  
After a series of court cases and fifty-year long debate, the city and county of San 
Francisco outlawed burial within city limits. Beginning in 1826, property rights to plots in San 
Francisco’s public cemeteries are not given the same legal status as other forms of ‘real 
property’12, and burial grounds are subject to municipal police power13 regulation (Muckey, 
2015). Police power can be exercised by the state or delegated to local authorities such as a 
local police force (Lehrer, 1974). According to historian Lance Muckey, “After 1910, interments 
were legally prohibited within the County of San Francisco and the city’s cemetery owners and 
associations moved the majority of their burial operations, but not all of the existing cemeteries, 
to the unincorporated village of Lawndale, California (renamed Colma in 1941)” (2015, p. 169). 
 
10 Highest and best use is a real estate term defined as, “The reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or 
an improved property that is physically possible, appropriately supported, and financially feasible and that 
results in the highest value” (Dunn, 2010) 
11 Nuisance is a legal term referring to unreasonable or unlawful use of property. Legal nuisances can cause 
inconvenience or danger for individuals and/or to the general public. Examples include smells, noise, burning, 
and other misuses of property (Hill & Hill, 2020) 
12 Real property is a term used in law and real estate typically used to describe land. Generally speaking, real 
property includes not only the face of the earth but everything of a permanent nature over or under it. This 
includes structures and graves (Cornell Law, 2020a) 
13 Police power is power granted to the state by the 10th amendment to establish and enforce laws protecting the 
welfare, safety, and health of the public (Cornell Law, 2020b)  
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Officials issued eviction notices on January 14, 1914 to San Francisco’s “big four” cemeteries—
Calvary, Odd Fellows, Masonic, and Laurel Hill (Muckey, 2015). However, this was a slow 
process because those who own burial rights could legally challenge the law prohibiting new 
and existing burial in San Francisco (Muckey, 2015). Someone who has buried a loved one 
does not own the land the person is buried on, but rather they own the burial rights. This means 
when a cemetery is taken, the owner of the burial rights is both emotionally and financially 
affected because it is expensive to rebury the dead. For example, in 1946-47 the city of 
Baltimore relocated 170 bodies for the sake of new development. The estimated cost for 
removal and re-burial in new cemetery lots was $58,850 USD, approximately $346 USD per 
grave (Cemeteries in the City Plan, 1950). Considering inflation rates today, this would cost 
$780,676.94 USD total and $4,589.88 USD per grave.14 Despite the expense, 122,000 bodies 
were reburied in cemeteries outside of San Francisco starting in 1937 (Muckey, 2015). By 1941, 
only two cemeteries remained from the dozens that once existed within city limits and neither 
accept new interments15 today (Shelton, 2008). This made way for 162 acres of land in San 
Francisco to be reused (Muckey, 2015). San Francisco and Baltimore are not alone in their 
efforts to reuse land for more suitable purposes. Similar efforts were made by the Tennessee 
Valley Authority16 to make room for new reservoirs. Similarly, the city council of Basel, 
Switzerland purchased 125 acres of land in 1919 on a wooded hill called Hörnli to serve as the 
only cemetery on the edge of the city. Burials in the four existing cemeteries would stop that 
same year. The council also agreed that after the year 1952, all bodies from the existing 
cemeteries were to be relocated to Hörnli (Soliman, 2015; Cemeteries in the City Plan, 1950; 
Lehrer, 1974). Cemetery removal is not only expensive, but it is also a lengthy process. 
Ultimately, cemetery removal involves rewriting or ignoring an existing narrative because a 
“better” narrative is thought to be had. It is often about the “unmaking of a place” (Shelton, 2008) 
i.e. the ‘unmaking’ of a cemetery, which results in the ‘making’ of a new place.  
Cemeteries as Informal Settlements  
Cemeteries as a place to live are not a common phenomenon. One of the few existing 
cemetery settlements, is the Manila North Cemetery in the Philippines. Manila North Cemetery 
 
14 All 2020 calculations based on 1226.6% inflation rate. Inflation rates based on U.S. Labor Department's Bureau 
of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index (CPI)  
15 Interments is a term used to describe the burial of a corpse 
16 The Tennessee Valley Authority, or TVA, was created by President Roosevelt after the Great Depression to help 
America address issues in energy and promote economic development  
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is the largest cemetery in the Philippines, where 10,000 households live in the 135-acre 
graveyard (Liberman, 2009). People live in the cemetery rent-free and have limited access to 
water, electricity, and sewage (Liberman, 2009). The Pilipino government’s efforts to eradicate 
informal housing have historically been sporadic and reactionary to specific crisis situations 
(Special Committee Report, 1968). Government officials, including policemen and city-hall 
workers, live in the necropolis17 themselves (Liberman, 2009). Another cemetery settlement 
exists in Java, Indonesia. The cemetery itself arose in the early twentieth century, and it became 
a place to live in late 1984 when eleven dwellings were built. By 1993, there were eighty-one 
dwellings within the cemetery (Garr, 1995). Those who live in the cemetery do so primarily for 
its location in relation to employment opportunities (Garr, 1995). This cemetery is unique in that 
it is a Chinese cemetery that it is inhabited by Javanese. The Chinese minority in Indonesia 
have experienced constant social tensions for centuries, so it is unique to have the majority 
culture in Java, living in a cemetery for minority culture (Garr, 1995).  
In the Middle East, there are examples of cemeteries becoming a place to live 
particularly after or during a war. For example, a BBC video report identified a Syrian woman 
and her son who moved to a cemetery in eastern Aleppo to seek refuge (Ali & Bitar, 2016). 
Similarly, as of 2012, twenty-five families lived in mud huts over buried bodies in the largest 
cemetery in Baquba, Iraq. Families from poor villages migrated to the cemetery to flee from 
hostile rebels in their places of origin. Unlike the City of the Dead and Manila North Cemetery, 
there is no running water or sewage system in Baquba Cemetery. As a result, those living in the 
Baquba Cemetery created small channels to carry dirty water away from their homes (Al 
Jawoshy, 2012). 
As I will discuss later in detail, the City of the Dead (COD) is a series of cemeteries that 
have been adapted in creative ways to meet the housing needs of Cairo’s urban poor and rural 
migrants (Nedoroscik, 1997). Some of the first tomb dwellers worked as tomb guardians for rich 
families (Davis, 2006). Within COD are tombs and monuments mostly of Islamic significance. 
Though the cemetery is being utilized for two necessary functions i.e as a place to live and a 
place to bury the dead, the site is contested and demolition has been discussed since the late 
1960s (Abu-Lughod, J.,1971). In the rest of this section, I will discuss conditions and contexts 
specific to Egypt, where residents are predominantly Muslim.  
 
17 A necropolis is a term meaning ‘cemetery’ 
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The Importance of the Residential Unit in Islam 
Going back to the fundamentals of Islam is an important first step in understanding the 
role of housing in a predominantly Muslim country like Egypt. For Muslims, Islam is a not only a 
religion, but a complete way of life. It affects everyday tasks such as eating, shaking hands, and 
even using the restroom. As a result, housing is tied to their religion for Muslims. Stefano Bianca 
(2000, p. 72) writes in his book Urban Form in the Arab World, “[The residential unit] is probably 
the most complex of all elements of urban form”, and this is particularly true in a Muslim country. 
Bianca underscores the significance of the residential unit by saying, “Private houses and 
clusters of houses are the determining component of the urban fabric in Muslim cities not only 
because of their sheer quantitative dominance but also because of the particular attitude of 
Islam towards formal civic institutions and its relatively low emphasis on monumental public 
buildings” (Bianca, 2000, p. 72). Good neighborly relations shape the social fabric18 in Muslim 
cities because sacred Islamic texts address the importance of it. Islamic hadiths19 note that a 
Muslim should not leave his or her neighbor in poverty if he or she has the means to help 
(Bianca, 2000). This information is relevant because poverty in the Greater Cairo Region exists, 
namely the nearly 60 percent of Cairo’s population living in informal settlements, and 4 out of 
the 30 largest “mega-slums” in the world being in Cairo, the City of the Dead among them 
(Davis, 2006; Shakran, 2016). Not only is the residential unit important to the Islamic way of life, 
but the relationship that residents bear to each other, is also determined by their religion. 
Therefore, housing conditions of the poor in GCR stem from a complex history that the Islamic 
way of life is delicately intertwined with and determines. 
Cairo’s Urban Planning Efforts  
Egypt’s main planning organization called the General Organization for Physical 
Planning (GOPP), was established in 1973 and is state controlled at the national level. The 
GOPP as an organization focuses on physical planning issues “… is responsible for setting the 
overall policies of urban planning and sustainable urban development; as well as preparing 
strategic plans and programs on the national, regional and local levels” (GOPP Brochure, 2015). 
Under the GOPP, every major region of Egypt- including the Greater Cairo Region (GCR)- has 
its own Regional Center for Planning and Development (GOPP Brochure, 2015). The GCR 
 
18 Social fabric is a term used to describe how people interact with one another – frequent and meaningful 
interactions among community members make a strong social fabric 
19 Hadiths are additional Islamic teachings outside of the Quran 
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encompasses both the city center of Cairo and surrounding desert areas where new 
development is taking place. This includes the entire Cairo Governate20, the Giza Governate, 
and the Qaliubia Governate (Sims, 2010). Each governate has its own planning unit, albeit 
largely dependent on the GOPP. Governates are further broken down into districts (Cairo 
Governate alone has over thirty) that primarily handle minor planning functions such as building 
controls and permit distribution (Sims, 2010).  
Though my research site is located in the Cairo Governate, throughout this work, I will 
refer to the Greater Cairo Region (GCR), as the policies and implementation is common to the 
region. Changes and development in the region determine and impact the smaller governates. 
Further, existing literature also addresses the region as a whole, rather than each governate 
individually. Governates depend on the central government for funding and budget allocations to 
implement plans (Sims, 2003). Urban planning in Cairo has historically followed three general 
planning goals: demarcate and determine the borders or boundary of the city and therefore the 
extent of development, make the city center a more accessible and desirable place to live, and 
create a “new Cairo” in the surrounding desert. The first goal stems from the need to control 
Cairo’s overpopulation and subsequent overdevelopment problem, and it has been managed by 
hemming the city in through the building of surrounding walls and doors at the entrance of the 
city. The second goal was managed by building highways connecting popular destinations, 
namely the pyramids and the airport, to the city center. Lastly, the third goal called for creating a 
network of satellite cities intended to move urban growth away from Cairo proper, into the 
surrounding desert (Denis, 1996). The plan to expand Cairo began during the 1970’s, around 
the same time the GOPP formed. People often critique Cairo’s expansion model of satellite 
cities because they do not address overcrowding in Cairo proper, as the city itself is hemmed in 
(Kelly, 2010). Instead, the satellite cities around Cairo contribute to Cairo’s housing crisis which 
has become a “wicked problem”21. This is because many of the satellite communities, which 
were planned and developed as large apartment complexes for wealthy Cairenes to escape 
from the noisy city center, lie vacant today (Denis, 1996). Much of this new housing stock does 
not match the needs of Cairo’s 20 million residents.22 This contributes to the majority of Cairo’s 
population living in more affordable informal areas built in 1950 or later. The housing stock in 
 
20 Governates are the main divisions of local administration in Egypt (Sims, 2003). 
21 Wicked problem is a term introduced in Planning literature by Rittel and Webber to describe the seemingly 
unsolvable nature of particularly social problems (Rittel & Horst, 1973) 
22 18 million residents was the figure given for Cairo’s population in 2011 (Sims, 2013). It is estimated to be at 20 
million today in 2020 
15 
the satellite communities is too expensive for low income residents. The Egyptian Human 
Development Report (EHDR) estimated poverty lines in 1998 to be $0.83 per capita per day 
(Sims, 2003). According to the report, urban households making 4,438 Egyptian Pounds (LE) 
per year23 and rural households making LE 3,963 per year24 were considered to be 
impoverished (Sims, 2003). According to this study, 22.9 percent of households in Egypt are 
impoverished. (Sims, 2003). However, numerous independent studies on poverty in Egypt count 
up to 48 percent living in poverty (Sims, 2003). Independent studies show that up to 48% of 
Cairanes do not have enough money to live in market-rate housing and cannot afford their non-
housing needs. The new apartments, due to their location further away from the city center, also 
necessitate the investment of more money by low income residents for their everyday commute 
to and from the city center, where jobs are located. Wealth and poverty noticeably coexist in 
GCR, as is the case in effectively all megacities (Sims, 2010).  
Master Plan 2050 
Cairo is perceived by some as a city dominated by overpopulation caused by an 
overflow of poor people (Bayat & Denis, 2000). Partially in response to this narrative, 
government officials drafted Masterplan Cairo 205025 (Tarbush, 2012). Cairo 2050 began in 
2007-08 and was presented in 2010 as a series of mega-projects intended to modernize Cairo 
and counter the city’s informal urbanization with planned development (Tarbush, 2012). The 
plan proposed displacing informal residents, including those in the City of the Dead (Tozzi Di 
Marco, 2011), by moving them to “new housing extensions” in the desert (Tarbush, 2012). This 
focus of Cairo 2050 helps us understand that powerful interests, such as the state and GOPP, 
are calling out informal housing as one of Cairo’s biggest problems. Yet, Cairo 2050 does not 
provide details about the new housing extensions or the relocation process. Many scholars 
agree that the government’s efforts should be shifted away from excessive building in the 
surrounding desert and instead focus on the needs of the majority of residents (Tarbush, 2012). 
But if informal housing is caused by a lack of affordability, then whose problem is it? As 
indicated in the section above, the state, which includes functions of the government, ultimately 
controls the factors that contribute to housing affordability. However even though the state 
makes overtures to address this housing affordability crisis, interventions are woefully 
 
23 Equivalent to $1,268 USD 
24 Equivalent to $1,132 USD 
25 Masterplan Cairo 2050 is referred to as Cairo 2050 in this research. Sometimes referred to as Vision 2050 in 
literature or news articles. The plan is not officially published, but can be accessed online by the public 
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inconsistent, and do not address the problem at hand but rather address a different class of 
Cairo’s residents. The following section will discuss the government’s involvement in the 
provision of affordable housing in Egypt.   
Egypt’s Government and Affordable Housing  
Between 1950-1973 Egypt’s government took the lead on providing low-cost public 
housing through the building of publicly funded, subsidized housing. More specifically, the 
polices during this era prescribed the government as the primary provider of such units. It was 
during this era that the government built a significant amount of housing structures and 
subsidized the units within. (Chaarawi, Ally, Martins, Rodrigues, 2016). From 1973-1982 the 
Egyptian government shifted roles from sole provider to facilitator in affordable housing 
provision (Chaarawi et al., 2016). During the 1970s, new state-owned construction companies 
formed while the private sector was simultaneously encouraged to enter the housing market. 
This made way for additional housing providers such as private developers to enter in the 
housing market. It was during this time that the government established a rent control law that 
taxed owners and provided a subsidy to tenants. However, owners would get around this tax by 
charging tenants “key money” i.e a fee for the right to rent. This significantly increased the price 
of rent and many units remained vacant until a wealthier tenant could afford the key money 
(Feiler, 1992). During this period, no new subsidized affordable housing was built by the 
Egyptian government (Blunt, 1982). The role of the government again shifted from 1982-2005 to 
focus on attracting citizens to the new satellite communities (Chaarawi et al., 2016). Heavy 
investments were made by the government in road infrastructure to make satellite cities 
possible (Feiler, 1992). During this time, the government promised basic housing needs for low 
income residents at an affordable price in the desert, but the government did not deliver 
(Chaarawi et al., 2016). Instead, expensive housing units continued to be built in the sprawled 
desert by the government (Chaarawi et al., 2016). There was a lack of demand for this type of 
housing development in the desert. Private housing production for both affordable and market 
rate housing decreased during this era, leading to an increase in housing prices in Cairo 
(Chaarawi et al., 2016). The government hoped to deal with the economic loss of failed housing 
estates by passing a new law that allowed more autonomy between landlords and tenants to 
determine housing rates and eviction procedures (Chaarawi et al., 2016). Additionally, in order 
to privatize urban development, the government sold large portions of land to real estate 
developers in the mid-1990’s (Almatarneh, 2013). Since 2005, the government has encouraged 
more stakeholders, such as international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations 
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(NGO’s), and citizens themselves, to play a role in formal housing provision (Chaarawi et al., 
2016). In short, stakeholders now have power in the process to build where they want and how 
they want, while the central government has power over the process through a supervisory role. 
While allowing more stakeholders to be involved in the process has empowered stakeholders, it 
has also allowed opened the gates for more corrupt practices (Chaarawi et al., 2016). The 
government has transitioned into a more ‘laissez faire’26 real estate approach for affordable 
housing provision, but it still desires to eradicate informal settlements (Cairo 2050, 2008; Egypt 
2052, 2014). Continuous illegal development on a mass scale indicates a lack of state 
response, even though the government says it is being proactive in counteracting it (Sims, 
2013).  
As in most countries, Arab states across the Middle East, have a large set of laws that 
oversee and control any and all development by private entities (Sims, 2013). Examples of 
these laws include building codes, subdivision laws, maximum building heights, and property tax 
laws. Furthermore, these laws specify the committees, agencies, and officials responsible for 
enforcing the laws (Sims, 2013). Local governments are entrusted with monitoring compliance 
of urban planning laws, but these offices are often understaffed with poorly paid, unexperienced 
workers (Sims, 2013). Furthermore, workers are seldom given proper vehicles to inspect their 
ever-growing territories. As a result, informal communities are rarely inspected (Sims, 2013). 
There is also evidence that in some cases, informal dwellers, bribe local officials to not enforce 
the laws (Sims, 2013). While the government claims to be responding to informal housing, there 
is very little evidence of concrete changes. The government has opted out of affordable housing 
provision, yet the government is tasked with responding to informal housing. More specifically, 
once Cairo 2050 was presented, the government assigned itself with the task of responding to 
informal housing. Generally speaking, neither the root of the problem (lack of affordable 
housing) nor the fruit of the problem (informal housing) are addressed in a substantive way by 
the government. 
 
26 ‘Laissez faire’ is a term referring to an economic system that is “hands off” in nature. Meaning, the government 
does not interfere 
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“Solutions” for Upgrading Informal Housing 
How Cairo has Previously Handled Informal Housing  
The Egyptian government ignored informal settlements until the 1980s when plans to 
stop their growth were produced (Abdelhalim, 2014; Maher, 2017). The government’s primary 
way of addressing informality settlements was demolition and relocation. Relocation displaces 
residents of a particular area, who are forcefully or willingly moved to another area (Maher, 
2017). Forceful relocation typically involves government officials, and in some cases armed 
forces, vacating informal settlements to then demolish all existing structures. The construction of 
new houses and service provision are the governate’s responsibility (Amnesty, 2011). These 
new places to live are usually in public housing with low rental rates. However, the new houses 
are usually in a remote location, at a substantial distance from their original community (Maher, 
2017). Relocation therefore causes a break in existing social and economic networks of mutual 
aid that residents have formed. An example of a poorly handled relocation process is that of the 
informal settlement called Duweiqa in Cairo. While relocation was not initially prompted by the 
government, an appropriate relocation process was still the state’s responsibility. During 2002-
2008, a series of disasters such as fires, train crashes, and rockslides happened in Cairo and 
destroyed much of Duweiqa (Cook, 2011). The state’s mishandling of the situation is evident 
when examining the aftermath of these disasters. The rockslide disaster destroyed dozens of 
homes and more than one hundred people died. It took hours for officials to respond. The 
officers who responded did not conduct search and rescue but rather “secured the area” (Cook, 
2011). The Cairo Governorate bulldozed the areas in Duweiqa that were most damaged by 
rockslides. Some survivors in this area were relocated into nearby abandoned buildings with the 
promise of later being relocated to better housing. Later the government insisted that 
“scammers” who moved to Duweiqa after the rockslides were taking advantage of the 
government’s offer for free housing and no housing was provided as a result. In the end, formal 
housing was never delivered, and a few officials were required to pay a small fine for how the 
situation in Duweiqa was improperly handled (Cook, 2011). Had this been a formal housing area 
perhaps the aftermath would have been handled differently.  
Formalizing Settlements 
Formalizing settlements is seen as a keyway to integrate the informal into the formal. 
Formalizing informal settlements is the process of transforming the legal status of an informal 
settlement from illegal to legal. “Addressing the informal urbanization challenge can be a win–
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win situation for everyone as improvement programs not only benefit the urban poor, but the city 
as a whole,” (Khalifa, 2015, p.1158). This thought, while altruistic, is often romanticized by 
scholars and planners. Upgrading informal housing by providing quick fixes is similar to 
rearranging the chairs on the deck of the Titanic (Roy, 2005). It doesn’t work because this 
“solution” imagines formal and informal sectors to be perfectly separated and easily identifiable. 
Though some literature does advocate for formalizing settlements, the limitations of this process 
are readily expressed. Formalizing settlements is complex because there are many 
stakeholders in the housing market (Soliman, 2002). The success or failure of formalizing efforts 
depends on the conditions under which land is occupied, otherwise known as land tenure. The 
landlord’s assertiveness, or lack thereof, plays a significant role in the ability to formalize 
property. The attitudes of both the landlord and involved stakeholders can make or break an 
attempt to formalize (Soliman, 2002). There is not an existing step by step guide for formalizing 
areas because every informal settlement is different. Instead of formalizing settlements through 
upgrades or transforming the legal status of settlements, Egypt typically handles informality by 
evicting and demolishing settlements to build something new. This was the case for Maspero 
Triangle, an informal settlement that faces ongoing violent demolitions in an effort to formalize 
the urban fabric of Cairo (Shakran, 2016). Much of the literature concerning “ideal” settlement 
formalization approaches the subject from a community participation angle. One rare Egyptian 
example of participatory upgrading will be discussed further in the following section.  
 Community Participation Approach 
Built environments are designed by a minority but affect the majority (Eldemery, 2002). 
Some believe that the solution for formalizing illegal settlements lies with the people who live in 
them because of their motivation to change their circumstances (Boonyabancha, 2012). Lack of 
public participation, ineffective governmental institutions, and deficient regulations are the 
reasons for the low levels of community satisfaction (Shalaby & Shalaby, 2018). Many poor 
Cairenes feel that the government is “against their existence,” so transitioning from a top-down 
planning approach to a bottom-up planning approach may be helpful (El Shahat & El Khateeb, 
2013, p. 8). Top-down planning prioritizes decision making at the highest government level, and 
input is generally not welcome from citizens or lower forms of government. Bottom-up planning 
prioritizes incorporating citizens in the decision-making process, and specialists and 
professionals give feedback on those ideas to make plans (El Shahat, et al., 2013, p. 8). 
However, if this approach is used simply to formalize the informal, it is still incorrectly viewing 
the sectors as perfectly separate from one another. The Community Participation Approach is 
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better than exclusively formalizing settlements because this approach should address 
community integration by focusing on community needs rather than the needs of those who 
control the formal sector.  
 The User-Controlled Approach  
A step even further in the right direction is the User-Controlled Approach, which allows 
residents to guide their housing process by selecting the size, location, and design of their 
home. According to researcher Khaled Galal Ahmed, “It is an approach aimed at achieving a 
more relevant housing product for low- income people” (Ahmed, 2015, p.204). This process 
could be used for relocation, as informal residents must not be relocated from their environment 
and placed into an area that does not resemble their culture or preferences. (Ahmed, 2015). It 
can also be used when developing a new community. Though this is a bottom-up process, 
authorities should not be left out of the process, and professionals should aid residents in this 
approach (Ahmed, 2015). One could argue that informal homes were already designed and built 
by the users, and that is what led them to be illegal. However, Khaled Ahmed suggests 
implementing the User-Controlled Approach goes beyond that because it incorporates individual 
participation and government regulation (Ahmed, 2015). 
One Settlement in Egypt: A True Success  
The upgrading project for the Hai al-Salam settlement in Ismailia, Egypt ran from the 
mid-1970s until 1983 (Howeidy et al., 2009). It is considered to be a success in upgrading 
projects as it used the User-Controlled Approach to allow people to build their own homes on 
plots of land that had access to state provided infrastructure (Howeidy et al., 2009) According to 
a report regarding Egyptian informal housing, “Most of the land was subdivided into small plots 
of 100 square meters, which were then sold for very low prices to the people of Ismailia. Then, 
10% of the land on the best streets was kept off the market and eventually sold by auction. That 
10% brought in money to finance the project” (Howeidy et al., 2009, p.181). Upgrading this area 
of Ismailia was necessary because after the Six Day War27 ended in 1967, the residents of 
Ismailia were evacuated. After the 1973 War28, residents were allowed back only to find six 
 
27 The Six Day War was a brief but deadly conflict in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states of Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan 
28 The 1973 War known to Israelis as the Yom Kippur War.  In the Six Day War the Israelis captured the Sinai Desert 
from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank of the River Jordan and the eastern part of 
Jerusalem from the Jordanians. The 1973 war was Egypt’s attempt to gain back the Sinai. Egypt got back the 
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years’ worth of damage and neglect. Migrants from Sinai29, during this time, began to squat on 
vacant land around Hai el Salam. The User-Controlled Approach was necessary because “with 
the rapid re-occupation and expansion of the city, it was clear that the Government’s traditional 
approach to housing - namely, that of the Governate and other public agencies providing 
subsidized rented accommodation - was insufficient to meet the growing and varying needs of 
the population (Blunt, 1982). Low income groups were affected the most, as the only available 
places to live were in informal settlements or in expensive market rate rentals (Blunt, 1982). The 
User- Controlled Approach guaranteed security of tenure to the residents, allowed residents to 
build a place to live, and provided basic services for residents (Maher, 2017). Throughout his 30 
years as a consultant in Egypt, David Sims singles out this upgrading project as a true success 
story though it never had an impact on government policy, as it has never been duplicated 
(Howeidy et al., 2009). These different types of participatory upgrading approaches are 
underutilized in Egypt’s planning for informal settlements, particularly the user-controlled 
approach. Though not a perfect solution, it is a step in the right direction compared to commonly 
used top-down eviction and demolition approaches.  
Types of Housing in GCR 
Cairo’s housing stock is made up of different types of formal and informal housing. There 
are stark differences not only noticeable when comparing formal and informal housing but also 
when comparing different types of formal housing. Gated communities are just one type of 
formal housing, but a type that draws the most attention to the gap between the wealthy and the 
poor of Cairo. 
Gated Communities  
Among the various types of formal settlements in Cairo are gated communities. Gated 
communities are planned residential areas that are intentionally developed, outside Cairo, in the 
desert, as part of new satellite cities (Kuppninger, 2004). Characteristics of such communities 
vary from extravagant villas enclosed with greenery to smaller apartment buildings positioned 
next to a park (Kuppninger, 2004). Developers advertise these communities as luxurious 
neighborhoods offering safety, seclusion, and social status (Almatarneh, 2013). Gated 
 
Sinai with help of foreign diplomacy, not war (Connolly, 2013) 
29 The Sinai Peninsula lies on the Eastern side of Egypt. It is divided into two Governates: North Sinai and South 
Sinai 
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communities are often seen as a solution for present-day issues; however, gates function as a 
barrier between the outside and inside world (Ghonimi, Zaly, & Khairy, 2011). Though gates can 
be a tool used to prevent crime, scholars have debated their impact because they are seen as a 
symbol of exclusivity (Ghonimi et al., 2011). Gates leave insiders to invest solely in their 
community while leaving outsiders to make assumptions about what goes on within (Ghonimi et 
al, 2011). One might argue that adjacent areas are more negatively impacted than the gated 
communities because gates do not promote movement and interactions between community 
members, nor do they connect the urban fabric (Ghonimi et al., 2011). Communities with a 
strong social fabric typically have low crime rates, better health, significant economic growth, 
and well- educated citizens (Ghonimi et al., 2011). Mixed- use development30 is uncommon 
within gated communities. Gated neighborhoods in GCR take on foreign names such as Hyde 
Park and Beverly Hills, solidifying the desire for grandiosity and Western-inspired development 
(Almatarneh, 2013). Advertisements for gated communities depict foreign, white men and 
women laughing in open green spaces (Almatarneh, 2013). See Figure 1 for examples of 
advertisements for gated communities. 
  
Figure 1: Photographs taken from advertisements for two gated communities in the Greater 
Cairo Region: Allegria and Grand Hills neighborhood. The photo advertising Grand Hills (far left) 
depicts the Grand Zone Park, located in the gated community. The advertisement features a 
barbecue pit and inviting green space. The photos from the Allegria brochure (center and right) 
depict smiling well-dressed families and couples (Almatarneh, 2013, p. 569, 570). 
The housing crisis is partially caused by the number of vacant dwellings in gated 
communities. Research varies on the number of vacant dwellings, as some literature says there 
are as many as 2 million vacant homes while other works say only 467,000 are vacant (Fahmi & 
 
30 Mixed-use development is a type of development that mixes residential, commercial, historical, or office uses by 
incorporating these types of development into one area 
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Sutton, 2008). Despite varying figures, Cairo displays an anomaly in high levels of vacant 
residences. Greater rates of vacancy exist in higher income districts (Fahmi & Sutton, 2008). 
The literature describes different reasons why vacant dwellings exist. One being many 
developments remain unfinished; therefore, they are unoccupied. Another is that plots are often 
left finished but unoccupied due to location or price. It is important to note that gated 
communities are not the only type of formal housing. However, gated communities are a type of 
formal housing in Cairo that is not meeting current resident’s needs.  
Ashwaiyyat 
Literature refers to informal settlements as ashwaiyyat (Bayat & Denis, 2000; Kelly, 
2010). Various types of illegal settlements are necessary to satisfy basic housing needs for low-
income residents in Cairo. These developments are affordable because construction costs are 
lower compared to formal areas. Builders of ashwaiyyat do not pay for government permits or 
professional housing construction (Soliman, 2002). All types of informal settlements are lacking 
basic services in various ways, such as sewage and trash services, as well as social and public 
services (Soliman, 2002). Because these lands are not managed properly, there are significant 
environmental effects that lead to its deterioration (Soliman, 2002). Tall structures often block 
fresh air and sunlight from the interior (Tarbush 2012). Plots for illegal development are small 
and overcrowded because landlords subdivide their land in order to make more money 
(Soliman, 2002). There are different types of ashwaiyyat in Egypt. Ashwaiyyat can look like 
illegal additions made to a formal home, such as adding an additional floor without permission, 
or entire housing units illegally built on agricultural lands, particularly along the Nile. By 
definition, ashwaiyyat means random or haphazard, but as indicated above, the Egyptian 
government has narrowed the definition of ashwaiyyat to no longer include the City of the Dead, 
yet it continues to be a place to live somewhat haphazardly. Asef Bayat confirms that those who 
have quietly claimed cemetery space as a place to live have indeed created ashwaiyyat (Bayat, 
1997).  
The City of the Dead  
The history of how and when the City of the Dead was developed can be found in the 
Legality section in Chapter 4. This section will describe the cemeteries as they sit today and as 
a place to live. The 300-acre cemetery is a made up of a series of cemeteries that lie on the 
eastern side of GCR as a fully functioning neighborhood and burial site (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). 
There are three major sections of COD: the Eastern Cemetery (sometimes called the Northern 
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Cemetery), the Southern Cemetery, and the Bab el-Nasr Cemetery. See Figure 2 for a map of 
the main areas of the City of the Dead in context with the city of Cairo. The latter is unique 
because of its wooden mausoleums (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014) COD lies between Old Cairo and 
the Muqattam Hills (Elmessiri & Ryan, 2001; Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). The cemeteries are 
considered to be ‘open’ because of the tombs’ low density, showing everything that lies within to 
the outside world. Most of the tombs sit along a gridded street pattern (Elmessiri & Ryan, 2001). 
The City of the Dead is as old as Islam is to Cairo (Nedoroscik, 1997). Some of the most 
historical and impressive monuments of the Muslim world remain in the City of the Dead 
(Nedoroscik, 1997). Cemeteries in COD are dissimilar to traditional cemeteries found in the 
United States, for example, in that they are not made up of burial plots six feet deep with grave 
markers surrounded by green space (Soliman, 2015). Rather, the majority of burial sites consist 
of permanent, above ground structures surrounded by courtyards (Nedoroscik, 1997). See 
Figures 3 and 4 for reference. The need for built structures in a cemetery goes back to the 
Egyptian’s traditional mourning period lasting about forty days. During this time, the family of the 
deceased would live in the rooms built around the tomb to mourn and celebrate the life of the 
deceased (Nedoroscik, 1997). Many of these built structures have become temporary or 
permanent homes for much of the urban poor (Nedoroscik, 1997).  
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Figure 2: A map of the City of the Dead in the context of the city of Cairo. The map highlights 
the Northern Cemetery, the Southern Cemetery, and the Bab al- Nasr section of the City of the 
Dead (Prazeres, 2019). 
26 
 
Figure 3: An image of the permanent, above ground structures surrounded by courtyards 
located in the City of the Dead. The built structures are homes for residents in the necropolis 
(Half-Day Tour to the City of the Dead Necropolis from Cairo, 2020). 
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Figure 4: A traditional western cemetery found in North Carolina in the United States (Sagdejev, 
2008) 
 
Who Lives in The City of the Dead?  
The exact number of residents in the City of the Dead is unknown despite researchers 
attempting to expose discrepancies in previous population counts (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). 
Further research is needed to validate population counts, but estimates range from 50,000 to 
two million (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). According to Egypt Data Portal, an open source for census 
data that has been collected primarily from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics (CAPMAS), in 2017 there were only 1,805 individuals living in cemeteries in Cairo 
governate (Central Agency of Public Mobilization, 2017). Based on data collection for this work, 
200,000-250,000 people living in COD is a more acceptable estimate. May al- Ibrashy (2005) 
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gives a close estimate of 300,000 people living in Al-Qarafa. Some of the first communities of 
the City of the Dead were made up of tomb keepers and watchmen, along with their families 
(Nedoroscik, 1997). As time went on, rural migrants to Cairo became the primary residents of 
the City of the Dead. Generally speaking, rural migrants saw the City of the Dead as a 
temporary solution until they could save enough money to afford market-rate housing. Up to 
third generation tomb dwellers are now living in COD (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). Rural migrants 
from the countryside typically stick together in COD and have called it a village without fields 
(Nedoroscik, 1997). Other types of tomb dwellers include owners of small workshops or 
businesses, gravediggers, the elderly, and the unemployed. There are also middle-class 
residents living in COD because of unexpected problems with their previous living situation 
(Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). It is rare that someone willingly chooses to live in the City of the Dead 
without needing to, though some have intentionally sought out COD to live near deceased 
relatives (Nedoroscik, 1997). Nevertheless, all of these groups live in COD. The way people live 
in COD evident in how portions of the necropolis, for example, turn into a market, or souq, on 
certain days of the week (Elmessiri & Ryan, 2001). Selling goods is not the main feature of the 
market but rather passing time is. Those who go to the market to sell goods actually go to loiter 
and simply be present in the area. Authors Elmessiri and Ryan (2001) explain that sellers are 
sometimes surprised when a buyer comes along and expresses interest in an item. Sometimes 
a seller is hesitant to part ways with the for-sale item because if all items are sold, the seller 
would no longer have an official loitering spot at the market. Another example of the living 
culture in COD are those working as caretakers of graveyards who live where they work and 
work where they live (al- Ibrashy, 2005). The funerary business has brought life to a dead 
space. Some of the daily tasks a caretaker might do are raking gravel around a tomb area and 
watering flowers. Caretakers also act as guards by sitting in front of a tomb for much of the night 
to make sure it does not get vandalized (Howeidy et al., 2009). While mourners of dead loved 
ones come and go, those who work in the funerary business and other residents remain in the 
cemetery and offer a constant presence that only their living there could provide (al- Ibrashy, 
2005). Perhaps similar to a neighborhood coffee shop or café, neighborhood regulars make a 
coffee shop a place because of their constancy in going there or sitting at the same table. While 
the community inside COD do everyday tasks and build relationships with one another, those 
who do not live in COD misunderstand the way it functions. The community of COD is 
marginalized because it is perceived by outsiders as a place of shame for poor people. It has 
been described as a cancerous growth in the city that represents Cairo’s urban and economic 
problems (al-Ibrashy, 2013; Tozzi Di Marco, 2011). Children and young adult residents of COD 
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feel this acutely when venturing out of the tomb communities for school or other needs. Mona, a 
nineteen-year-old resident of COD, keeps a journal about the discrimination she has 
experienced in the school she attends in a nearby district. Mona, unlike both of her parents, can 
read and write Arabic. In her journal she describes school kids yanking her hair and throwing 
her schoolbooks out of a window because of where she calls home (Howeidy et al., 2009). The 
discrimination Mona faces outside COD surely affects her daily live in the necropolis, as this is 
evident in the way she keeps a journal about such events.  
Demolition and Future Planning for City of the Dead  
Planners and government officials have objected COD as a place to live due to its 
inefficient land use for modern day Cairo (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). Demolition and 
redevelopment have officially been discussed since the late 1960s (Abu-Lughod, J., 1971). In 
1984, a decision was formally made to demolish the cemetery and replace it with a public 
garden. This did not happen of course, though a partial demolition occurred in 1989 which 
destroyed several important graves. Several small demolition and relocation instances followed. 
Some residents in the Bab el-Nasr portion of the cemetery were relocated in 1987 because of 
anticipated redevelopment plans by the GOPP. Another partial demolition followed in 2001 in 
the same area which forcibly relocated nearly 100 households (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). Both the 
GOPP and government officials have recommended that residents of COD be relocated to new 
housing areas and that the plots also be relocated. Though these plans and recommendations 
exist, government has been relatively slow to take action (al-Ibrashy, 2005; Fahmi & Sutton, 
2014). Literature speaks to several potential scenarios for COD other than relocating residents 
and redeveloping the site to match surrounding development. The following is not an exhaustive 
list, but rather a snapshot of mentioned solutions. One is that COD would function exclusively as 
a burial ground, preserving the historical monuments and mausoleums. Another is that COD 
would function as a center for cultural and religious tourism (al-Ibrashy, 2013). An 
unconventional solution is that the funerary function of the site ends, and the structures are 
embraced as an affordable housing solution (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). It is my position that this is 
the best solution for COD because there is a need for affordable housing to accommodate low 
income residents. Cemetery dwellers have already created functional places to live in the 
cemetery at the risk of eviction (though the government has been slow to act). This was not an 
intentional act of defiance, but rather a response to a wider systemic breakdown in the formal 
housing market and the state (Nedoroscik, 1997; Soliman, 2002). Perhaps this unconventional 
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solution would officially recognize and respond to the needs of those who already have a home 
there.  
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Chapter 2 - How I Answered My Question 
Methods 
Qualitative research, by nature, explores the complexities of humanity (Kim, 2015). In 
this work, I use qualitative methods to unpack the narratives of tomb communities within the City 
of the Dead (COD). I do this through the narrative analysis of 5 interviews with experts on 
Cairo’s current urbanism. I supplement this analysis with data from 10 supplemental sources 
such as planning reports, photo-essays and documentaries about the COD.  
“Narrative is from Latin narrat (“related” “told”), narrare (to tell), or late Latin narrativus 
(“telling a story”), all of which are akin to Latin gnārus (“knowing”)” (Kim, 2015, p.6). In other 
words, narrative is a form of knowledge that involves both telling and knowing. Additionally, 
narrative does not leave us, nor is it confined by time and space. Narrative is everywhere as we 
dream it, remember it, construct it, and plan around and with it (Kim, 2015). Scholars such as 
Gerald Prince (2003) define narrative as the remembered and repeated recitation of real and 
fictional events. Narratives are ultimately stories that connect a set of past events or personal 
experiences (Cortazzi,1994). Narratives often support a particular viewpoint held by the 
person sharing the narrative. For this work, narrative is specifically defined as a story or 
representation of a particular place. Robert Beauregard (2005) explains, “before places 
become objects of urban planning and design, they exist in personal experience, hearsay, and 
collective memories. Standing between planners and designers and the sites on which they 
hope to act are socially embedded narratives. And, while these place narratives can be ignored, 
they cannot be wholly erased” (p. 39). All places exist in space, as well as in narrative. Socially 
embedded narrative defines a place and planners and design professionals, interact with the 
place first and foremost through this narrative. Narrative, particularly narrative of place, is 
deeply intertwined with how planning decisions are made and with who makes them.   
In recent times, planning scholarship has witnessed a paradigm shift towards a more 
participatory form of planning which also includes a move towards acknowledging and engaging 
with diverse place-based narratives (Ameel 2017). Planning theorists such as Leonie 
Sandercock (2010), argue that this “story turn” in planning theory and practice comes from a 
need to account for the “…diverse kinds of ways of knowing that exist apart from technical 
knowledge” (Ameel 2017, p.319). Further, planning practice today envisions the planner as a 
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moderator of competing narratives. Beauregard (2005, p.47) claims that, “we know little about 
how urban planners and designers actually go about the deconstruction of place and the 
narrative construction of site. We do know that intervention cannot occur, development cannot 
happen, until that site is brought under control, situated in a professional discourse. To arrive 
there, prior narratives are reduced in number or, in some instances, totally eliminated”. 
However, newer scholarship in planning tackles how planners deconstruct and construct 
existing and new narratives. Ameel (2017) for example explains that planners through the 
writing and creation of planning documents create new narratives. Planners as narrators 
“..recount a story, usually aimed at the inhabitants of the area affected by planning…most of the 
recounted events will be real enough, but planning documents tend to involve also conjectured 
elements, such as claims about what an area will look and feel like in the future” (Ameel 2017, 
p.321). Rarely are sites ‘undeveloped’ before a new narrative is given to it, and investment for a 
new development requires support of the new narrative (Beauregard, 2005). Further, planners’ 
narratives of a place are part of a large variety of narratives about that place that exist including 
those by inhabitants, those by the press, those by other interested parties, and those by 
politicians. However, Beauregard is correct in claiming that in order for planners to intervene, 
certain narratives are privileged over others. This work intervenes at this juncture and tries to 
unpack the various narratives of the COD that exist. Through the narrative analysis of primary 
and secondary data, this work tries to reconstruct the various narratives of the COD, particularly 
those that construct it as a place to live.  
Primary Data  
I conducted semi-structured interviews to reveal how individuals perceive and give 
meaning to their understandings of the City of the Dead (Kim, 2015). My initial source for 
participants was my friend and professor Amir Gohar. I used snowball sampling to find 
additional willing participants.  
The questions asked were pre-determined and open-ended. As a result, I was able to 
ask follow-up questions. The pre-determined questions were categorized into three groups: 
embedded/historical narratives, daily narratives, and future narratives. The following is a list of 
the pre-determined questions in their respective categories:  
 The embedded/ historical narratives  
− Can you tell me the history of the City of the Dead? 
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− Why do people live in the City of the Dead today? 
− In what ways do you value the historical qualities in the City of the Dead? Such as important 
tombs, the citadel, etc.  
 Daily narratives 
− How is the City of the Dead different from other informal settlements?  
− What do residents of the City of the Dead not understand about the City of the Dead? 
− How does the City of the Dead affect how outsiders perceive the city of Cairo?  
Future narrative  
− How are planners addressing the City of the Dead?  
− How likely is it that the tombs will be demolished? If so, how long might that take?  
− What do you hope the City of the Dead looks like in 5 years? 
− What do you hope the City of the Dead looks like in 30 years?  
I recorded 5 interviews on a GoPro camera. 4 interviews were conducted in person in 
Cairo, and 1 interview was conducted via phone while I was in Cairo. The 5 participants spoke 
English as a second or third language. A translator was present at every in-person interview and 
was needed occasionally throughout the interview. Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 1 hour 
in length.  After I returned to the United States with my recorded interviews, I manually 
transcribed each interview by listening to it and typing out both questions and answers.  
 Participants  
My first interview was with Abdullah Al-Attar. Abdullah is a faculty member in the Urban 
and Regional Planning department at Cairo University where he primarily teaches urban design 
courses. Abdullah is also a co-founder of GATEWAY for Urban Development (GWUD), a 
consulting firm that specializes in urban planning, site engineering, and landscape architecture. 
He currently serves as the design manager for GWUD. In my work, he is addressed by his real 
name and is categorized as a planner or an urbanist.  
My second interview was with Samir Mahmoud. Samir works in Egypt’s General 
Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP). He is formally educated as an urban planner. Samir 
is a pseudonym, as he instructed me to keep his official title confidential. In my work, he is 
categorized as a government official.  
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My third interview was with Khalil Shaat. Khalil is the senior advisor to the Cairo 
Governate on informal areas. Khalil has a background in business administration. Much of his 
work experience is related to conflict resolution and mediation. Khalil does not have a formal 
background in urban planning. In my work, he is addressed by his real name and categorized as 
a government official.  
My fourth interview was with David Sims. David is an American economist and planner 
who has worked in developing countries for nearly 50 years. Sims studied economics at Yale 
University and city planning at Harvard University. Sims has worked as an advisor and 
consultant on issues pertaining to housing, land management, finance, and community 
development, and he currently resides in Cairo. In my work, he is addressed by his real name 
and is categorized as a planner or an urbanist.  
My final interview was with Amir Gohar. Amir is an urban and landscape planner. Amir 
earned a PhD from UC Berkeley in Landscape Architecture & Environmental Planning. His 
research interests and specialization are in urban development, land use, eco-tourism, and 
public participation. Amir has worked extensively in developing counties with municipal 
governments, private sector consulting firms, and international development agencies, 
specifically the World Bank. Amir currently works as a Senior Lecturer and Course Leader in the 
School of Art Design and Architecture at the University of Huddersfield in the United Kingdom. 
In my work, he is addressed by his real name and is categorized as a planner or an urbanist.  
Supplemental Data  
During the interviews, I asked about supplemental data sources that are related to my 
research. After my interviews, I searched for books, articles, videos, interviews, and planning 
documents pertaining to the City of the Dead on the internet to serve as secondary data. I 
compiled all of the information about each source on an Excel Spreadsheet to determine which 
sources would be best for this research. See Table 1 for a list of supplemental sources used in 
this work. Details on how I analyzed both primary and secondary data can be found in the 
following section.   
Category Author Type Title Date 
Popular Media Zeina Elcheikh on 
Cairo Observer 
Egyptian Blog Where Life and 
Death Share a Space 
2014 
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Popular Media Tadamun  Egyptian Blog Cairo 2050 
Revisited: Where is 
the Cairo Strategic 
Development 
Vision? 
2014 
Popular Media Christopher Reeve 
on Egypt 
Independent 
Egyptian News What Ever 
Happened to Cairo 
2050? 
2011 
Popular Media Sarah El-Rashdi on 
Abram Online 
Egyptian News Tales from Cairo’s 
living City of the 
Dead 
2013 
Popular Media Alexander Nesbitt Photographs City of the Dead, 
Cairo 
2000 
Popular Media Tamara Abdul Handi Photographs City of the Dead 2009 
Popular Media Asmaa Waguih Photographs Living in the City of 
the Dead 
2015 
Popular Media Ahmed Yehia  Film Karakon fe al- 
sharea 
1886 
Popular Media Alessandro 
Molatorre on Al 
Jazeera 
Film City of the Dead 2012 
Academic May Al Ibrashy PhD Dissertation The History of the 
Southern Cemetery 
of Cairo from the 
14th Century to 
Present: An urban 
study of a living 
cemetery 
2005 
Academic May Al Ibrashy Study Historic Cemeteries 
Component of the 
Urban Regeneration 
Project for Historic 
Cairo 
2013 
Academic Amira Howeidy et al.  Study Informal Areas: 
Between urban 
challenges and 
hidden potentials 
2009 
36 
Academic* Charles Abrams Book Man’s Struggle for 
Shelter in an 
Urbanizing World 
1966 
Academic David Sims Book Understanding 
Cairo: The Logic of 
a City out of Control 
2010 
Academic Nezar AlSayyad Book Cairo 2011 
Academic Wael Salah Fahmi & 
Keith Sutton 
Journal Article Living with the 
Dead: Contested 
spaces and the right 
to Cairo’s inner-city 
cemeteries 
2014 
Academic Anna Tozzi Di 
Marco 
Journal Article The Reshaping of 
Cairo’s City of the 
Dead 
2011 
Academic* Erhard Berner Journal Article Learning from 
Informal Markets: 
Innovative 
approaches to land 
and housing 
provision 
2001 
Academic* Piyush Tiwari & 
Pritika Hingorani 
Journal Article An Institutional 
Analysis of Housing 
and Basic 
Infrastructure 
Services for all  
2013 
Academic Housam Darwisheh Journal Article Egypt Under Sisi: 
From an 
authoritarian 
dominant party 
system to strongman 
politics 
2019 
Official Document General Organization 
for Physical Planning 
(GOPP) 
Planning 
Document 
Cairo 2050 2008 
Official Document Ministry of Housing, 
Utilities and Urban 
Communities 
Planning 
Document 
Egypt 2052 2014 
Official Document Ministry of Planning, 
Monitoring and 
Planning 
Document 
Vision 2030 2016 
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Administrative 
Reform 
 
Table 1: List of supplemental data sources. An asterisk indicates that the content in the 
supplemental data is not about Cairo, Egypt or the City of the Dead but rather a similar place or  
a relevant topic helpful for this discussion on COD as a place to live. 
Analysis 
Primary Data 
In order to analyze the data collected from the interviews, I coded using the ‘In Vivo’ 
method. In Vivo coding focuses on coding by pulling out exact quotes from the data (Saldaña, 
2016). “In qualitative data analysis, a code is a researcher-generated construct that symbolizes 
or “translates” data” (Saldaña, 2016, p.4). In my case, I am using a researcher-generated code, 
but it is as close to what the respondent would generate because my codes are exact quotes 
taken directly from the interview. I coded my interviews by hand. I did not code the things I said, 
only what the respondent says. By using intuition and keeping in mind my research question, I 
coded key words or phrases by underlining them in the transcripts and also writing the code 
word-for-word in the margin. The text on every interview transcript was double spaced and each 
page had three-inch margins to write codes out to the side. After coding each interview, I wrote 
a memo to help identify themes. A theme is a repetitive or consistent occurrence of data that 
appears more than once (Saldaña, 2016). If codes from multiple respondents were similar or 
repetitive, those codes then fit under a theme. For example, when asked ‘How is the City of the 
Dead different from other informal settlements?’ Most respondent applauded the grid system 
that is in the COD. The code ‘grid system’ would fit under the theme ‘urban fabric.’ The codes 
from each interview fit under 8 themes that I have identified from the interviews. These themes 
emerged through memo writing, re-listening to interviews, and reading the interview transcripts 
multiple times.  The themes in this work are services, legality, planning, community, historical/ 
cultural, urban fabric, relocation, and governance. I assigned each theme a color. As codes 
became themes, I color coded the code to match the assigned color for the theme it fit under. 
For example, the theme ‘urban fabric’ was color coded blue. On my paper interview transcripts, I 
would highlight the code ‘grid system’ or any word or phrase that meant the same thing blue. 
This helped me keep organized as I analyzed the narratives through this coding process. See 
Figure 5 for an example of how I coded one of my paper interview transcripts.  
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Figure 5: Example pulled from an interview with one respondent to show In Vivo coding system 
and highlighting for themes (Author’s photo).  
The following is the list of themes found in this work and examples of what might be 
coded under that theme:  
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− services: water, sewage, electricity, schools, religious learning centers such as 
madrassas31, mosques, religious centers, the ability to secure a job  
− legality: encroachment housing tenure, terminology used to describe those who live in 
COD, reasons people live in COD, migration  
− planning: current planning, future planning, specific plans and policies, development, type 
of planning practices, the monetary value of the site, tomb demolition 
− community: community, relationships among residents, relationships between tomb 
dwellers and outsiders, the relationship between tomb dwellers and the deceased  
− historical/ cultural: architecture, famous burial sites, historical and cultural monuments, art 
− urban fabric: grid system, low density, location in Cairo, courtyards 
− relocation: moving tomb dwellers to a different location, self-relocation 
− governance: specific leaders, type of government, the state 
I ultimately wanted to understand how the respondent qualified the themes and how 
these themes do two things: 
1. Form the narrative of the City of the Dead 
2. Heavily influence negative planning outcomes proposed in policy documents 
Supplemental Data 
After coding the 5 interviews, I analyzed 10 pieces of supplemental data. I obtained 
these pieces from both American and Egyptian news outlets, online freelance writing, 
professional photographs, and official planning documents about Cairo’s current planning and/or 
the City of the Dead. I analyzed all written material by reading each piece multiple times. I 
underlined key words or phrases by using intuition and keeping in mind my research question. I 
did not use In Vivo coding to do this because of time as a limitation. Additionally, I already had a 
specific set of themes that emerged from the analyzing primary data sources. The supplemental 
data is used to enhance or complete the narratives respondents shared during interviews. The 
underlined key words and phrases identified in the supplemental data sources were placed in 
my work to have a conversation with the primary data. The supplemental data will either support 
or counter the narratives respondents hold about any given theme (i.e services, planning, 
relocation, etc.) in this work. For example, if one respondent says infrastructure provision in the 
 
31 A madrassa is an Islamic religious school 
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City of the Dead adequately supports those who live there and a supplemental news source 
interviewing resident about infrastructure provision takes the opposite position - my work will 
highlight these differences and allow the narratives to sit conflicting on the same page. I also 
introduce my positions about the various narratives that have emerged in this work. Another 
reason for adding supplemental data to my work is to provide a wider variety of narrative than 
what only five interviews could offer. For example, several sources from my supplemental data 
set directly quote respondents who were interviewed for this work. Not all of the supplemental 
data used for this work was in written form; much of it was visual, including videos and 
photographs. I included this type of data because visual information can add to a narrative in a 
way that text alone cannot.  
The following is an example of how I analyzed photographs in my dataset: I analyzed 3 
photographers’ work on the City of the Dead. In order to determine the photographers’ 
narratives about the COD, I took into consideration the photographers’ descriptions about each 
photo if a description was provided. I looked at each photo individually and I also compared 
each photo to the other photos from that particular collection. For example, I took note of how 
many photos depicted people on their own, away from other community member. I looked for 
evidence of poverty and wealth. I wanted to see if the photographers focused more on the dead 
than the living. One limitation with analyzing photographs to determine narrative is that I do not 
know how much knowledge the photographer has about Cairo’s current planning agenda. 
However, I do know that how we see or understand a site determines how we plan for it. 
Essentially, how these photographers see the site is translated into their work. Photographers, 
writers, media, etc. are contributing to the narrative of this place. Whether the sources of my 
selected supplemental data are aware of it or not, they are contributing to the narrative of this 
place. Those interviewed have some power in controlling the future narrative of the City of the 
Dead. The people I interviewed have probably not interacted with every piece of supplemental 
data I analyzed, but they are surely interacting with similar sources.  
Limitations 
This study was limited by several factors. Initially I intended to learn the narratives about 
the City of the Dead from the tomb dwellers themselves, but due to a crime that took place in 
the Bab al Wazir section of the cemetery involving a foreigner, I was unable to interview 
residents in that particular section. I hoped to interview residents from this section of COD 
because data on it is limited.  Because the nature of my research shifted after I arrived in Cairo, 
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it was difficult to find willing participants to interview during my stay. I also want to acknowledge 
the lack of diversity in interview respondents as a limitation. For example, I did not interview 
women or professionals who were young in their planning career. Four out of five respondents 
are Egyptian, and all of them are males. Another limitation is that I do not speak fluent Arabic. It 
is likely that interviewees could not communicate their ideas and thoughts fully because I do not 
speak their native tongue. Lastly, time was a limiting factor for this study, as I only spent three 
weeks in Cairo to collect data for this research. 
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Chapter 3 - What I Found 
For the City of the Dead, services, legality, planning, community, historical/cultural, 
urban fabric, relocation, and governance are urban planning characteristics that contribute to 
the site’s ability to be a place to live. These characteristics emerged as themes while coding 
primary data (interviews). Secondary data is used alongside the primary data to strengthen this 
analysis. This section will analyze each theme found my coding process.  
Legality 
It Was Always the City of the Living  
What is known as the City of the Dead today was planned and developed for funerary 
purposes on the periphery of what is now Cairo, Egypt (formerly the city of Fustat). The 
development of the City of the Dead began in 640 A.D., the second year of the Muslim 
Conquest in Egypt (Elcheikh, 2014; Tozzi Di Marco, 2013). Several dynasties and conquerors of 
Cairo including the Abbasids, Fatimids, the Ayyubids, the Mamlukes, the Ottomans, and the 
French, left their mark on the cemetery. More specifically, several of these dynasties made way 
for people to live in the City of the Dead.  
The Abbasid period started in 750AD (2003, Timeline of Egypt, University College 
London). According to May Al-Ibrashy (2005, p.33), “Archaeological evidence has shown that 
the tradition of building a structure that provides accommodation of sorts for the visitor or the 
caretaker of a family graveyard dates back to the Abbasid period”.32  The Fatimids ruled in 969 
AD- the same year the city of Cairo was founded- and placed important structures such as 
mosques and mausoleums into the cemetery (Nedoroscik, 1997). The Fatimids also built 
structures around tomb sites for families to pay respects to the deceased. By this time, the 
structures accompanying the graves were being used as living quarter, with documented 
evidence that Fatimids “took up residence” in the cemetery (Al Ibrashy, 2005). Italian 
Anthropologist Anna Tozzi Di Marco, has lived in COD since 1998 and writes that some of the 
first residents of COD consisted of custodians, or guardians, who maintained important graves 
 
32 The archaeological evidence found by excavation efforts led by the French Archaeological Institute included built 
structures from the Abbasid period used for shelter, small gardens, water provision, and storage (Al Ibrashy, 
2005). 
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(Tozzi Di Marco, 2011). By 1000 A.D, the majority of the inhabitants in Egypt were Muslim 
(Nedoroscik, 1997). Ibn Jubayr, a traveler who visited Cairo during the Ayyubid dynasty in 1183 
AD, recorded that the cemetery was inhibited by “strangers, learned men, the good, and the 
poor (or Sufis)" (Al-Ibrashy, 2005). The Mamlukes ruled in 1250 AD and expanded the cemetery 
by constructing residences, schools, sporting venues, and areas for trade (Nedoroscik, 1997). It 
was during the Ottoman era that the first wave of rural to urban migration to the cemeteries 
began (Tozzi Di Marco, 2011). The construction of all current cemeteries was completed by the 
beginning of the 15th century (Al Ibrashy, 2013). The French Occupation, which lasted from 
1798 to 1801, is significant for Egyptians because it is used to mark the start of modern Egypt 
(Al Ibrashy, 2005), so it is no surprise that today’s planners give this timeframe as a potential 
starting point for the City of the Dead. It is also during the French Occupation that there was a 
shift towards a more western understanding of land-use and planning emerged in Cairo. This 
shift deemed the proximity of cemeteries to other land-uses unhealthy. As a result, an effort to 
ban all non-funerary activities in the cemetery gained a lot of support during the 1920s (Al 
Ibrashy, 2005).  
Nezar AlSayyad (2011), in his book Cairo documents that the transformation of COD 
“into a residential area” was one of the ways that Cairo absorbed great numbers of rural 
migrants in the 1960s when migration was at a peak and Cairo was at its most populous at 6.1 
million people. 
Its [COD] elaborate courtyard structures, and the tombs and funerary complexes of 
Mamluk and Ottoman nobility, were taken over by squatters. Living in the cemetery 
[COD] was not a new phenomenon; since the Mamluk times, tomb custodians had 
offered shelter to pilgrims and Sufi mystics. And in the early twentieth century, the tombs 
in northern Cairo were occupied by men who worked in the limekilns, while quarry 
workers occupied the tombs in the city’s southern areas. Prior to World War II, Cairo’s 
cemeteries housed a population of more than fifty thousand. Despite efforts by the regime 
to resettle and relocate these people, the number of cemetery residents grew to more than 
one hundred thousand before the end of Nasser’s two decades in power. Many of those 
squatter families lived in mud huts in the courtyards of the historic tombs. – AlSayyad 
2011 p. 246 
 Interview respondents explained that the history of COD is complex and that it is 
impossible to pinpoint when people began to live in the space.  
44 
Some people say that it didn’t show in the old maps in the French Occupation. Others say 
these cemeteries, the City of the Dead, has been there before the French Occupation 
maps. You can’t just determine what year it started. -Abdullah 
You won’t be able to find the exact answer to this because it’s an intermittent issue…but it 
is safe to say that maybe after 1960, or the beginning of the war in Egypt, between 1960-
1970, this problem is clearer in this period because after the war immigration increased, 
so maybe we can say around 1960-1970. -Samir  
While respondents disagreed on the exact date people began to inhibit COD, both 
academic evidence and respondent knowledge evidenced here underscores the fact that COD 
has long been a place for people to live. The date of physical construction of the cemetery is not 
disputed among planners and government officials, but the idea that the cemetery has almost 
always had people living in it is either not known or not acknowledged and reflected in planning 
decisions. Here is evidence of certain narratives being privileged in planning decisions and 
documents over other narratives. It is clear in academic literature that COD has long been a 
place to live, it is also clear from archeological evidence, when it became a place to live. 
However, planning decisions and documents are seemingly premised on COD being only a 
cemetery and not a place to live. A question to consider here is how does the presence of 
residents help the City of the Dead in terms of legality? Once the cemetery was filled by the 
living, it became a place to live. However, it is clearly problematic that the date COD became a 
place is unclear in colloquial understandings of COD, as that makes it easier for planning to 
focus on it being a place for the dead.  
People’s Presence and the Evolution of Legality  
During the seventeenth century, population in COD declined. However, by the end of the 
century, the first wave of migration of Islamic scholars from rural Upper Egypt grew the 
population (Tozzi Di Marco, 2011). The second wave of rural to urban migration to the 
cemeteries began around the First and Second World Wars and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. As a 
result, COD’s resident population grew and diversified. One of the major differences between 
the first and second wave of rural to urban migration is that the second migration consisted 
mostly of families (Tozzi Di Marco, 2011). Migrants came to Cairo seeking new opportunities but 
found housing options were limited and unaffordable. Nezar AlSayyad (2011, p. 247) writes that 
during this second wave “...cemetery population came to consist of migrants from rural Egypt 
who could not afford to live elsewhere in Cairo.”  
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Many people come for jobs without having sufficient and affordable housing. And this 
definitely affects urbanization because you have a huge number of people living without 
suitable housing. So, this is one of the reasons for the slums of Cairo -Samir  
Samir Mahmoud, a high-ranking government official who works in Egypt’s General 
Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP), gives some insight on the official narrative about 
which should come first - secured housing then migration or migration then securing housing. In 
other words, should the migrant know that he or she will surely be able to secure affordable 
housing before coming to Cairo? Or should it be assumed that the government will have already 
ensured an affordable housing stock exists for migrants? Samir suggests that it is the migrant’s 
responsibly to secure housing before moving. This is significant because his thoughts directly 
affect decisions to supply affordable housing for residents in Cairo. Others such as Khalil 
acknowledge that the government has failed to provide housing to migrants.  
The government due to many reasons, some of which were the many regional wars33 and 
the different issues going on, regarding the housing issue the government was doing its 
best to provide housing, but these were not enough to accommodate everyone migrating 
from different parts of Cairo. So, people took it into their own hands, and some of them 
built ashwaiyyat, encroaching on government-owned land, and some of them took things 
in their own hands and opened the burial site and started to live there. -Khalil 
I mean people live in the City of the Dead, people that basically have no places to live… 
If you look at Maslow’s Hierarchy of needs, that’s safety and shelter. So, they’re not 
thinking or understanding or believing basically anything but that they need a ceiling to 
live under, a shelter to live under. Whether this is right, whether this is wrong, whether 
they are encroaching on someone’s privacy, whether they are tampering with a place that 
is owned by someone else, that’s not a concern to them. Is it right or wrong? Again, I 
cannot say it is right, and I cannot say it is wrong. People need to live, so they took it into 
their own hands, and they are encroaching on their burial site. -Khalil 
Both these quotes- from Samir and Khalil- make it apparent that the current narrative 
around housing provision is not clear. Whose responsibility it is to provide housing – the 
government or is it the resident? If it is the latter, residents in COD certainly did provide their 
 
33 Particularly the 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
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own housing. But why would they intentionally do so in a cemetery? And why do people remain 
in COD today? In order to fully understand this, we need to zoom out and get a better 
understanding of the current housing stock in Cairo. The housing problem in Cairo is not one of 
availability, it is one of affordability.  
The Narrative of Legality and Demolition  
Though Khalil says that he cannot say if it is right or wrong that people live in COD, it is 
clear from his interview the he is unhappy with the current state that COD is in.  
If there is a chance to improve the area in accordance with the rules and regulations of 
religious guidelines, maybe to widen a road or to make a park next to the area, that’s up 
to the planner of that area. I’m not aware—I’m sure that it’s not a part of their plan to 
demolish the religious sites34. But to leave them the way they are, this is not acceptable to 
anyone. For me as a resident of Cairo, as someone that is in love with Cairo, deep love by 
the way, I think that I will support and agree and do whatever it takes to see improvement 
to these sites in a proper manner -Khalil 
While government officials acknowledge the difficult circumstances that led many to live 
in COD, both government officials, Khalil and Samir, do not recognize this as a viable housing 
option because cemeteries are not inherently housing. In other words, their narrative imagines 
the City of the Dead as not being able to be a housing settlement because of its funerary 
function. As a result, there are plans to “upgrade” the site.  
I cannot accept this is a housing option. Not from the professional point of view, even 
from the personal point of view. This is an option they took on their own, and it’s not a 
housing option. -Khalil  
The government’s plans to demolish, relocate, and develop the City of the Dead will be 
explained in the Relocation and Planning sections of this chapter. For now, it is important to 
determine if relocating tomb dwellers on the basis of legality is even possible. One of the key 
justifications for relocating tomb dwellers is because COD was not planned for people to live in 
it. It is acknowledged by all respondents that the spatial component of COD is legal because the 
cemeteries were formally planned, but according to government officials, the social uses of this 
 
34 It is important to note here that Khalil first begins this sentence with “I am not aware…” Almost all plans for COD 
involve demolishing the tombs. This will be further discussed in the Planning section of this analysis 
47 
site were not. As stated above, this idea can be challenged by examining how dynasties and 
rulers encouraged residential uses in the cemetery. Another way to determine if relocating tomb 
dwellers on the basis of legality is possible is by understanding who owns the tombs and the 
land. Generally speaking, the tombs are privately owned but the land is publicly owned. 
Occasionally, the owner of the tomb is the one who lives in the space around it. If the owner 
does not live in the space, they pay guards to maintain the plots or open the gate for visitation 
purposes. If the owner of the tomb does not frequent the site, it is common for the tomb guard to 
rent the tomb area to a different family though he does not have the legal right to do so. As a 
result, most residents of COD are paying into an informal economic system. One respondent 
confirms that the tomb guard is profiting off of renting tombs.  
He is [the tomb guard] likely benefiting from any transactions or renting because he’s just 
there -Amir 
Another respondent confirms that these rental transactions are benefiting the informal 
economy. 
There is an informal system of paying someone, I’m not sure who. But definitely they are 
not paying the government -Khalil 
The National Population Council (NPC) study from the 1990s which sampled 1500 
households in the cemeteries also confirms this. The survey revealed 12% of households pay 
rent. Over half of those paying rent paid the tomb guard (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). Residents who 
do not pay rent typically help the tomb guard with his work (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014; Howeidy et 
al., 2009). It is not clear in literature if owners of tombs are renting out areas to make money, 
though David Sims says this does happen sometimes. 
If it got sort of taken over by the guardian then he rents it out, or the owner himself 
makes a little money by renting it out -Sims 
One respondent passionately disagrees by saying:  
That’s outrageous- definitely not! If I have some loved one that’s buried in a place and I 
go and get paid to have someone live in that burial site, no - this is not the case -Khalil 
It is clear there are a variety of ways people are paying or not paying to live in COD. The 
owner of the tomb, whether they are making money are not, surely has to be aware that 
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someone is living in that space. David Sims, an American economist and planner currently 
residing in Cairo, does not consider it illegal for people to live in the City of the Dead because 
either the owner of the tomb allows their presence, or the owner passively turns a blind eye 
regarding unwanted occupants. To make his point, Sims describes the Arabic phrase amory 
waaka,35 meaning what is, is. This phrase is often used in legal settings by judges in Egyptian 
courts when there is not a solution other than keeping something the way it is. To take his point 
a step further, the owner of the land (i.e the government) is very much aware that people are 
living in the cemetery. One could argue that because the government has yet to change the 
status quo of the cemetery, it should continue to be a place to live. After all, what is, is.  
Urbanization  
Sims certainly makes a case for residents of COD to be considered legal. Another case 
can be made by examining CODs urbanization over time. It is important to note here that 
urbanization is a process. Informal housing is characterized by illegal methods of urbanization 
(Tarbush, 2012). Initially, those controlling COD’s urbanization encouraged people to live in the 
cemetery. Until the Ottoman rule, there was no distinction between people who lived in COD 
and those who did not because COD was widely considered to be a pleasant place to live 
(Tozzi Di Marco, 2011). It was socially acceptable to live in COD or have mixed land uses that 
involved a cemetery, particularly before the French Occupation. How might this call attention to 
its legitimacy as a (legal) place to live today? We know that those controlling COD’s current 
urbanization consider it illegal for people to live in the City of the Dead (this is how we can justify 
that the City of the Dead is an informal settlement today), but if it was initially acceptable (and 
legal) for people to live in COD, shouldn’t that be considered when addressing the current 
occupation and the future planning surrounding this place?  
Narrative of Spirituality and Encroachment 
Though my position towards COD is that it is a place to live, I would be remiss if I did not 
mention the spirituality and importance of this burial site. COD is home to invaluable Islamic 
graves, mosques, monuments, and other impressive religious and funerary buildings (Fahmi & 
Sutton, 2014). According to respondents, residents are not concerned about encroaching and 
tampering with the burial grounds.  
 
35 This Arabic phrase can also mean ‘current state’ or ‘existing situation’ عقاو رما  
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It is encroaching on the spirituality and the sacredness of the place. It is a sacred place. 
People are being buried there. Though it is a deserted place, and people are not going 
there, the family maybe is not living in Cairo they are not living there, but in a way you 
are tampering with this place. -Khalil 
It is important to note that most families are not living underground with the deceased. 
They live in above ground structures and courtyards. This clarification helps us shift our mindset 
to a more positive one in terms of legality. Interestingly, the same respondent who mentioned 
people encroaching on the site also shared the following when asked if residents are adding on 
to the tombs: 
They are careful not to do that… It is a financial cost they don’t want to get involved in so 
they were very selective in going to places that were very convenient to them and its 
already furnished in a way that they do the minimum for this place to be inhabitable -
Khalil  
Another respondent adds that residents do, however, make minor changes to make their tomb 
structures feel more like a home.  
They are definitely changing the windows, creating spaces to sit, some shades. The 
changes are minor to accommodate people without creating massive urban change -Amir 
If a stakeholder’s narrative is that people are encroaching on the cemetery and 
tampering with the burial site, naturally their solution to this would be to evict and relocate those 
responsible. But if a stakeholder’s narrative is that people are using the space to create a place 
to live without creating massive urban change, the idea of eviction and relocation might seem a 
bit extreme. So which narrative prevails?  
Relocation  
We know that informal housing emerges primarily because of lack of affordable housing 
caused by state and market failures (Berner, 2001). But this does not tell us why informal 
housing is often demolished and residents are relocated. One way to get a better understanding 
of demolition and relocation as a way of addressing housing informality is to unpack the 
commonly held narrative about where and how informal housing emerges. Erhard Berner is a 
lecturer at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, The Netherlands and has written 
extensively on communities’ responses to urban poverty. He says there is a misconception 
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about the haphazard nature of informal settlements and as a result, demolition seems like the 
obvious “solution” to powerful interests and even to the public.  
“The terms 'spontaneous settlements' and 'clandestine subdivision' suggest that urban land 
is just there for the taking by enterprising individuals and families. This picture is 
misleading” -Berner, 2001, p.297  
“Most illegal settlements are merely seen as a violation of private or public property 
rights, and this leads formal settlers and government officials to believe the obvious 
solution is demolition and relocation” -Berner, 2001, p.295 
Berner expresses here that the process informal settlers undergo to create a home is 
nuanced. This is because two conditions must be met on the land before it becomes an informal 
settlement. First, the land must be well located. Second, the land must have access to a water 
source. COD is unique in that though it is a burial site, it does meet both of these necessary 
conditions. It is centrally located in Cairo (to be discussed further in the Urban Fabric section of 
this chapter), and it does have access to water sources (to be discussed further in the Services 
section of this chapter). These conditions in addition to people’s physical presence in the 
cemeteries helps legitimize the site as a place to live. But because cemeteries are not inherently 
housing, government officials hold the narrative that COD is not a legitimate place to live. Plans 
for demolition are birthed out of this narrative and often justified as a city improvement plan.  
Massive demolitions and evictions are justified on the grounds of improvement and 
beautification of the city, removal of centres of crime and health hazards, and more 
intensive and lucrative use of land in strategic locations” -Berner, 2001, p.295 
While these justifications may seem logical from a physical land-use perspective, 
demolition and relocation rarely have substantial benefits for the city, the economy, or informal 
settlers.  
Relocation Location 
Relocation sites are rarely provided to all who have been evicted. If new residences are 
provided, they are often located in an undesirable location. Respondent Amir Gohar sheds light 
on this by focusing on the economic disadvantages informal settlers face when relocated.  
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Most of the alternatives of discussion that happens with them [residents in COD] is about 
relocating them on the other side of Cairo which takes away their sources of income and 
jobs -Amir  
Relocation sites for Cairo’s informal settlers are typically in the surrounding desert of 
Greater Cairo. Christopher Reeve, a writer for an Egyptian news source called Egypt 
Independent, confirms informal residents are typically moved to desert cities that are 
undergoing construction. He discusses the brief mention in masterplan Cairo 2050 to relocate 
informal residents to “new housing extensions” in the desert. He elaborates on how the 
government does not have the capacity to do this properly (if there were a “proper” way to do 
such a thing).  
“Controversy has surrounded the government’s capacity to fairly compensate displaced 
families, as well as its desire to move families into desert cities such as 6th of October 
and New Cairo, which are still quite vacant. Some consider those areas undesirable due to 
a lack of transport options and general isolation” -Reeve, 2011 
Journalist Christopher Reeve and urbanist Amir Gohar agree that relocating informal 
residents to a location that limits their ability to have a secure job or get to that job is not ideal.  
They often lose one or more sources of livelihood as they are forced to move away from 
the area where they had jobs or sources of income. Where provision is made for 
resettlement, this is almost always at a distant site where the people are expected to build, 
once again, their homes but on land with little or no provision for Infrastructure and 
services. Those evicted rarely receive any financial support for rebuilding. The land site 
on which they are relocated is also very often of poor quality -Fahmi & Sutton, 2014, 
p.24 
Authors Fahmi and Sutton reveal through survey data that the majority of residents who 
were affected by the 2001 partial demolition in the Bab El-Nasr section of the cemetery agree 
that relocation affects economic stability. 100 households were relocated by these efforts. 40 
relocated heads-of-households (or 40%) were surveyed. 32 people (80% of those surveyed) 
give the disruption of economic structures as a negative outcome of relocation. This was 
especially true among tomb guards (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). A response given by a female tomb 
dweller who was relocated from her home in 2001 to a desert community portrays appreciation 
for her former access to services and economic opportunities.  
52 
"In Bab El-Nasr Cemetery at least we were in the centre of the city, we could get Jobs. 
The men could earn some money to feed their families. Out here there is nothing. Some 
of us had shops, or a tea cabin, while most of the women like me worked in different 
areas nearby doing housework. We earned about (125-150 LE) Now, this place is so far 
from the city that we have to spend (5LE) a day on transportation” -Fahmi & Sutton, 
2014, p.23  
Fahmi and Sutton are researchers who have collaborated on several writings regarding 
Cairo’s current urbanism and contested spaces. Their study provides a residential narrative that 
validates the often poorly located relocation site and inability to financially carry-on as some of 
the biggest downfalls with relocation. Berner says the evicted feel more comfortable seeking out 
other informal housing in the city than living far away from their old settlement, and those who 
have a little bit of financial means make the choice not to live in relocation housing (Berner, 
2001). One resident’s commentary from the survey collected by Fahmi and Sutton confirms that 
Berner is correct to say that those who can somehow afford not to relocate far away from their 
former settlement do not.   
"Only the poorest came out here. Those who had a little money did not shift here. They 
rented a place in Manshiet Nasser36 or somewhere else nearby. They said that at least 
they were close to their source of livelihood. If we had some money, maybe we would 
also move somewhere close to our workplace. Nobody cares for us and nobody will do 
anything for us. We will just have to slowly rebuild our homes all over again” -Fahmi & 
Sutton, 2014, p.23 
Globally, most informal relocation efforts are carried out in peripheral locations 
(approximately 30-40km) away from the city centers (Berner, 2001). Government official, Khalil 
Shaat, says that this is not Egypt’s way of handling informality.  
The Egyptian government, for what I’ve seen regarding upgrading the ashwaiyyat part, 
the informal sites, they don’t upgrade and relocate people 40 miles away from their 
original destination. Actually, this is part of the guidelines that we have to work with in 
ashwaiyyat. The new location has to be within 3-5 kilometers (1-3 miles) -Khalil  
 
36 Manshiet Nasser is an informal settlement located close to the City of the Dead 
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When asked where relocate tomb dwellers might be relocated to, should that plan 
happen, government official Samir Mahmoud explains that the government can offer land in 
Cairo or in areas in the Greater Cairo Region. Interestingly, as Samir shared that there is plenty 
of land to offer evicted tomb dwellers, he did not talk about the social and psychological impacts 
relocation might have on residents.  
A Traumatizing Process 
Relocation is traumatizing, particularly for tomb dwellers, as small pockets of 
communities from the cemetery have in the past been forced to leave the home in which they 
have lived for decades (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). Watching the home, they have created be 
bulldozed to the ground is unsettling and emotionally trying. Fahmi and Sutton write that 
sometimes no warning is given before bulldozers destroy a settlement (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014), 
but government official Khalil Shaat disagrees with this claim.  
So basically, the government will not say, “Ok guys get out of here in 2 or 3 hours.” No, 
it will be a working program, cooperative efforts between and within the government 
with the people to do such a transformation -Khalil  
However, respondent Amir Gohar explains that offering new housing after an eviction 
may not be what informal settlers truly need. He believes that economic stability may be more 
important.  
I had a walk with one of the informal settlers and I said, “How much money do you want 
to get to go to work on a micro bus in Saudi?” He had no skills except driving. I said, 
“Would you go for 1800 Riads per month?” He said, “No, that’s too small.” So, I kept 
pushing it up… 1900, 2000. And when I hit 2100, he said, “Yea, I might go.” He kept 
keeping the math and transferring it to Egyptian Pounds. Then. I said, “Will you take 
your family?” He said, “No way! I’m going to leave them here.” So, I kept pushing the 
number up until we reached 2400, and he said, “Yes now I can take my family.” So 
apparently there is a financial model or threshold which makes them move. But what the 
government offers them is an alternative house. But what they want is an alternative job 
and income and livelihood, and that is not offered. - Amir  
It is impossible to pinpoint economic stability as the solution for all informal settlers 
because economic stability cannot be considered in isolation. It must be considered in the 
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context of housing. The conversation above regarding the need for residents to live close in 
proximity to economic opportunities must stand. Location, after all, is one of the two conditions 
that must be considered before land becomes an informal settlement. Informal settlers value not 
only having economic opportunities but living next to them. Along these lines, informal settlers 
have additional needs that should be met where they live. These will be discussed in the 
following section.  
Services 
Services and Infrastructure Systems 
A service is a broad term for something that is necessary to live a safe, healthy, and 
ideal quality of life. In most cases, services are either provided solely by the municipal 
government or provided by government approved contractors. In this work, services include: 
electricity, water systems, sewage systems, economic opportunities, medical facilities, mailing 
facilities, and educational facilities. In this section, I focus more specifically on provision of, and 
access to physical services in COD i.e. electricity, water systems, and sewage systems and 
refer to those as ‘infrastructure’. In earlier times, when COD was accepted as a place to live and 
later as it became a place to absorb rural migrants, services were absent. Nezar AlSayyad 
(2011), documents that while during the 1960s COD and other cemeteries came to be 
dominated by a population of rural migrants “who could not afford to live elsewhere”, services 
were missing. 
Many of the squatter families lived in mud huts in the courtyards of the historic tombs. 
Such dwellings had no connection to municipal utilities such as water, sewers, or 
electricity, although some resourceful residents connected illegally to electrical lines. -
AlSayyad, 2011, p. 246-247 
In contemporary times, resident access to infrastructure in COD depends on many 
factors such as their location of residence within COD, the resident’s ability to either formally or 
informally obtain infrastructure, and the economic status of the legal owner of the tomb (from 
whom residents rent the space). The wealthier the legal owner of the tomb is, the more likely 
that the built structures will have access to electricity, water, and sewage.  
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Infrastructure Systems and Services Necessary for a Place to Live 
The topic of infrastructure is unfortunately overlooked in the debate on housing. Without 
basic infrastructure, the concept of housing is incomplete (Tiwari & Hingorani, 2013). This is 
because without water, sewer, and power, residents might not feel dignified or comfortable 
interacting with other people. Someone might be less likely to build community if he or she 
cannot bathe regularly with clean water or use a toilet in a private place that is connected to a 
sewer system. Someone might also be less likely to connect with someone over a meal if he or 
she does not have electricity to cook or refrigerate food. Infrastructure contributes to one’s 
ability or inability to form and maintain a healthy community. Housing as a stand-alone structure 
shares the same definition as the word ‘shelter’. Shelter protects from the elements, but it does 
not offer access to opportunities, community, or an identity. Only after shelter is supported by 
urban services and basic infrastructure can it add value to someone’s well-being. The same is 
true for the City of the Dead. Not all structures in the cemetery have access to basic 
infrastructure. However, some structures do have access to it, and that is what makes those 
particular structures adequate places to live. Infrastructure alone does not transform a site into a 
place to live, but it is a necessary, and often overlooked component. 
Narrative of Limitation vs. Adequacy  
According to the already mentioned study by the National Population Council (NPC) 
which sampled 1500 households from 17 different areas within COD, 53% of residents were 
linked to piped water networks and 26.2% to electricity services, but only 3.8% to a sanitation 
system (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). It is important to note that this study was conducted in the 
1990s. This reveals a need to collect contemporary data about the current status of 
infrastructure in COD. According to the NPC study, nearly half of the households in COD do not 
have basic infrastructure. This negatively affects the health, safety, and well-being of both 
residents and nonresidents. For example, communities without proper solid waste37 
management openly burn garbage, causing residents to experience respiratory heath issues, 
heart disease, and headaches. This also contributes to overall air pollution, as toxic chemicals 
are released from burning (The World Bank, 2019). Lack of proper sanitation systems for 
human waste38 also negatively affects residents and nonresidents as untreated sewage can 
intercept freshwater systems. Additionally, electricity is needed for productivity in work and 
 
37 Solid waste, also referred to as trash or garbage, is everyday items that are discarded by a community 
38 Human waste is sewage 
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educational purposes (Tiwari & Hingorani, 2013). Without it, these efforts suffer and sometimes 
become impossible to do.  
Cairobserver is an online place (website) where specialists and non-specialists can 
contribute their thoughts and research on Cairo’s urban planning, architecture, and history. The 
aim of this site is to start conversations about how urbanists analyze places in Cairo and the 
policies that shape them. Content on Cairobserver is published in both Arabic and English. 
Zeina Elcheikh is a Syrian architect sharing her perspective of COD during her stay in Cairo 
studying informality. Her narrative offers perspective from a built environment specialist 
observing how people live in the City of the Dead.  
“water comes mostly from a public tap on the street, electricity through illegal 
connections, and septic tanks instead of sewage networks (in order not to damage the 
deceased)” –Elcheikh, 2014 
Her short yet descriptive analysis of infrastructure in COD helps us understand that 
electricity in this particular part of COD was illegally self-provided. This also helps us understand 
that septic tanks are a better sanitation system option than traditional sewage networks if the 
funerary function of COD should be preserved. Her analysis of COD focuses on the unfortunate 
wealth disparity between residents in COD and outsiders. She also notes the observable wealth 
disparity between the plots of wealthy deceased verses poorer deceased. One of her closing 
remarks highlights some of the reasons people are living in COD and also how difficult living 
circumstances (i.e. not having proper services and infrastructure) affects their quality of life.  
 “Whether it is a failure of housing policy, uncontrolled population growth, or just a 
search for a cheap (free) accommodation, living among the Dead has become a (sad) 
reality. I understood the state of being alive as more than breathing and having vital parts 
still functional” –Elcheikh, 2014 
Other supplementary sources such as photographs present visual examples that aid in 
forming a more in-depth understanding of the mechanics of informal living that authors such as 
Zeina Elcheikh present. Photographer Alexander Nesbitt is known for capturing moments that 
“define the spirit of being in a place”. He has been a professional photographer since 1997 and 
collaborated with accomplished photographer Mary Ellen Mark in 1998. His series on COD was 
his launch into a photojournalism career (Alexander Nesbitt, 2000). In the following photograph, 
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we witness the mechanics of informal living evidenced by a temporary water main, giving good 
insight on how water is provided in one particular area of COD. 
 
Figure 6: A teenage girl living in COD next to an above-ground water main (Nesbitt, 2000). 
Alexander Nesbitt’s narrative is also revealed in the way he describes his work as a 
photographer and his work in COD. The photo of the girl next to the water main has several 
searchable tags associated with it. Some of the tags read: ‘Cairo’, ‘People’, ‘Home’, and 
‘Poverty.’ He acknowledges the inadequate infrastructure in COD, and he acknowledges that he 
photographs “junky urban atmospheres” (Alexander Nesbitt, 2000). In short, his narrative is that 
COD has inadequate urban features but is still a place, more importantly, a place to live.  
Tamara Abdul Hadi is a photographer born to Iraqi parents in the UAE and raised in 
Canada. Her work focuses on the “the complexity and idiosyncrasy of minority communities that 
are often subjected to stereotyping and underrepresentation interchangeably (Abdul-Handi, 
2009). Meaning, her work focuses on groups of people with commonalities and atypical 
behaviors that are subject to negative labeling and misrepresentation. In her descriptions of 
COD, she uses phrases like ‘cemetery of the living’ and ‘home’. Though the particular images 
shared in this section showcase poor circumstances due to overcrowded living conditions in 
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COD, her narrative is that the community of COD is misrepresented. She documented the Bab 
al Nasr section of COD in 2009 and again in 2015. The following photograph from her collection, 
illustrates the small amount of space available to residents in tomb dwellings. This visual 
example allows us to understand how overcrowding in spaces lacking infrastructure may 
contribute to poor hygiene, a higher chance of becoming ill, the inability to work or study 
properly, and poor sleep habits (Solari, & Mare, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 7: A family in COD living in close quarters (Abdul-Hadi, 2009). 
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Figure 8: Boys in COD living in close quarters playing video games (Abdul-Hadi, 2009). 
 
It is likely that the family captured in Figures 7 and 8 by Tamara Abdul Hadi lives in a 1-
2-bedroom dwelling, as is common in COD. Most tomb quarters people live in are overcrowded. 
88% of the 1500 households sampled in 1998 lived in units made up of 2 room units, with 2-3 
people living in each room (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014).  
Both visual sources reveal poverty and inadequate services in COD, yet they portray 
COD as a place to live. This lies in the same realm as the “academic narrative” partially 
provided by authors Fahmi and Sutton. Fahmi and Sutton are researchers who have 
collaborated on several writings regarding Cairo’s current urbanism and contested spaces. In 
their analysis of COD, they explain that the combination of poor public services and 
infrastructure mixed with overcrowding in tombs reveals the need for a “major service and 
upgrading program” (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). In this work, Fahmi and Sutton reveal that 
structures where people have already created a place to live through other means (i.e. 
community, length of occupancy, personal additions to dwelling, etc.) are lacking basic 
infrastructure. This largely academic narrative focusses on COD lacking physical services and 
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suggests a need to expand infrastructure provision in COD, while at the same time 
understanding COD as a place where people have created a place to live. 
The primary data collected for this work reveals that both urban planners and 
government officials agree that living in a burial site has limitations. One informant named 
Abdullah admits that services and infrastructure systems are lacking in COD and play a role in 
why some residents chose to move out, if able. Abdullah is a lecturer in urban planning at Cairo 
University and teaches courses on urban design. He is also a co-founder of GATEWAY for 
Urban Development (GWUD), a consulting firm that specializes in urban planning, site 
engineering, and landscape architecture. Overall, his responses during the interview indicate 
that he is a proponent of bottom-up planning processes and generally supports people living in 
COD. At various points in the interview he explained that Egypt has operated for many years 
using a product-oriented planning process and that it should be changed.  
“I hope we can re-orient our development plans from bottom to top. Hearing what people 
need” -Abdullah 
He hopes that planning upgrades can improve urban services for the area. This view is 
however not necessarily shared by others in positions that shape public policy and narrative. 
Khalil is the senior advisor to the Cairo Governate on informal areas. Khalil has a background in 
business administration. Much of his work experience is related to conflict resolution and 
mediation. 
“Living in a burial site has its limitation, so people start to move out. Also, the 
government is encouraging such moving out”. -Khalil 
As exemplified by the quote above, Khalil does not approve of people living in COD. 
While Khalil does not have a formal background in urban planning, he is in a position of power 
in the government as the senior advisor. He advises planners and policy makers on how to plan 
for informal areas. Because Egypt’s new definition for informal settlements excludes COD, the 
cemetery is not his responsibility. However, Khalil’s comments are important because his 
opinions and suggestions regarding the current occupation and future planning of the site are 
recognized and respected by other government officials. Khalil also attends meetings with 
government officials who are directly responsible for making decisions regarding COD. Some 
residents of COD also agree that living in a burial site has limitations. In a 4-minute video tour of 
the City of the Dead produced by Al Jazeera in 2012, two residents were interviewed about their 
61 
living conditions, and their responses were overwhelmingly negative. One woman says it is a 
struggle to "live normally." She wants a proper house with water (Molatorre, 2012). Conversely, 
in an article written by Sarah El-Rashdi on Abram Online- an online Egyptian news outlet- a 
family living in tombs respond more positively by saying: 
“We are better educated than many Egyptians and as you can see, we have higher living 
standards. The revolution didn’t change our lives, we remain content and proud” -El 
Rashdi, 2013 
According to the article, this family’s home in COD has a sink, a gas cooker, a television, 
a tiny bathroom, and lights in the two bedrooms. Through a discussion around how “living 
standards have recently improved" and that “many graves now have electricity and running 
water” this article provides a justification for understanding COD as a place to live (El Rashdi, 
2013). These two sources in no way represent a holistic view of what life is like in COD, but 
present important opposing positions and descriptions of the same area when discussing 
services, infrastructure, and livability. These two data sources reveal two conflicting narratives 
among residents. The 2012 interview from Al Jazeera gives a voice to residents who do not feel 
they have adequate infrastructure and would prefer to live elsewhere. The 2013 article from 
Abram Online gives a voice to residents who feel infrastructure provision has recently improved. 
It is impossible to know exactly where in COD these two groups of residents live, but perhaps 
services upgrades in COD affected the residents interviewed in the Al Jazeera interview. If this 
were somehow the case, it would be an example of how personal narratives can change and 
evolve based on circumstances. In other words, provision of better services could help make 
COD more livable than it currently is. While residents continue to live in the tombs, and build a 
life there, additional service provision could aid in making life easier. 
Narrative Regarding Infrastructure Provision 
During the interviews I did not ask any direct questions about services or infrastructure, 
however, all respondents brought up both in their responses. I did ask follow-up questions about 
infrastructure provision after a respondent brought up the topic. Some specifically used the 
words ‘services’ and ‘infrastructure’ whereas others simply listed examples found in or around 
COD.  
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Respondents, particularly government officials, commented on the legality of 
infrastructure provision. Khalil explained that residents of COD can get water and electricity both 
legally and illegally.  
Most of the burial sites who are being occupied by the inhabitants, they are burial sites 
for rich families. Within the Egyptian context, if you have a burial site for a rich family, 
you have a little bathroom and a little kitchenette and a place when you visit your loved 
one you can basically spend half a day. Thus, you have bathroom that is linked to public 
sewage and they have water accessibility, electric, etc. -Khalil  
Most people in this area are not paying for electricity or paying for water -Samir  
In terms of the water, in terms of electricity, in terms of other utilities it is a formal area -
Samir  
Khalil’s response explains how a resident of COD has the ability to move into a tomb 
area that is already connected to infrastructure due to the economic status of the legal owner of 
the tomb. Both he and Samir agree that this scenario is most often how a resident’s dwelling 
has access to running water, electricity, and sewage. However, they both confirmed that a 
resident in COD can formally ask for an electric or water meter to be installed by going to 
particular ministry building and paying for the service. Samir’s confirmation of this is important 
because he is a high-ranking government official who works in Egypt’s General Organization for 
Physical Planning (GOPP). The fact that the government is willing to formally provide 
infrastructure is a step in the right direction because this validates that COD is a place to live. 
The narrative government officials give us is that infrastructure such as electricity, water, and 
sewage help formalize this area. According to the government officials, the government is not 
withholding services from those seeking them out formally. Perhaps, though, there is a 
disconnect in how easy government officials assume the process of going to a government 
ministry building to pay for service installation is for residents of COD and the reality of that 
process. It is important to bring out a conflicting narrative that academic writers Fahmi and 
Sutton hold about infrastructure provision. Their narrative is that government authorities are 
unwilling or unable to ensure infrastructure provision and urban services. As a result, Cairo’s 
poor do not have adequate or secure places to live (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). 
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Narrative Regarding Services and Location 
One key aspect of urban services is location. Location alone can make the difference for 
a housing development being good or great. Housing should be located near convenient transit 
options, diverse job opportunities, and social facilities, medical facilities, and sufficient schools. 
Portions of COD are well serviced while others are not. Sarah El-Rashdi also notes in her 
Abram Online article that, “In some parts of the neighbourhood there are apartment blocks. A 
medical centre, a post office and two schools were built for the community under Hosni 
Mubarak's government,” (El Rashdi, 2013). An extensive study by the Egyptian-German 
Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas (PDP) on Cairo’s informal areas 
confirms that there is a post office in COD with limited services as well as apartment blocks, 
schools, and hospitals built in abandoned tombs and on empty land in COD (Howeidy et al., 
2009). It is unclear if these apartment buildings have better access to services and infrastructure 
than the tombs in COD. One out of the five respondents confirm that apartment blocks have 
been built within COD: 
But in some of the areas around the burial sites they have like empty pieces of land… this 
is not a burial site, so people will start to build their own houses. In the middle it is like a 
building that is four to five or six stories -Khalil  
Along those lines, the Egyptian-German Participatory Development Programme study 
(Howeidy et al., 2009) shows that informality cannot be classified as one single thing. It unpacks 
the complexities of informality by providing perspective from residents, governors, ministers, 
academics, and consultants invested in the livelihood of these areas. The intentions of this 
study closely align with my research; however, it focuses on three different areas of informality 
in Cairo. One of those areas is the City of the Dead. This study gives a voice to two members of 
the COD community named Am Mohammed and Umm Khaled. Am Mohmmed has been living 
in COD since he was a teenager, and he is now in his 60s. He mentions the place he sleeps 
has electricity, running water, and a toilet. Umm Khaled was born in COD, and her residence 
has a gas stove. She has access to a dirt road and a nearby makeshift shop that sells tea, 
coffee, and cookies. Further down the road, she notes, there is an auto mechanic and tiny 
supermarket (Howeidy et al., 2009). The location of COD is beneficial for both residents and 
nonresidents. For example, driving schools bring their students to practice in the side roads of 
the cemetery. Construction supply shops sell goods near major roads. Such shops utilize yards 
around tombs to display products. The area is also known for dependable car maintenance 
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service, as auto mechanics from other parts of Cairo come to COD to wash cars and change oil 
(Howeidy et al., 2009). Two out of the five people I interviewed mention that children can go to 
nearby schools in Mashinat Nasr (a nearby informal area), but they also mention children learn 
to read in COD by preforming religious ceremonies. Fahmi and Sutton confirm there are a few 
primary schools that are centrally located in the cemetery (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014).  
The narrative according to Abram Online and multiple academic sources is that the 
location of COD enhances the lives of residents and nonresidents. Additionally, a limited 
amount of urban services such as schools, medical facilities, a post office, and a police facility 
exist in COD. Long-time residents of COD tell a descriptive narrative about the services and 
infrastructure they have access to. Umm Khaled and Am Mohammed both enjoy the area they 
live in. They express their narrative by sharing, “I like my area” and “We are a nice little 
community (Howeidy et al., 2009, p.67).” Urban services and infrastructure alone are not what 
led these residents to feel the way they do about their community. However, the narrative they 
hold is a positive one partially because of their access to infrastructure and services. Am 
Mohammed and Umm Khaled have lived in COD their entire life, and the services they have 
access to in COD has allowed them to do so. Having access to urban services depends on both 
the location of the service and the resident. Though urban services have the ability to improve 
one’s quality of life, they often require money to utilize. Having the ability to make money is 
unique in that it can be classified as an urban service because it is the state’s responsibility to 
provide economic opportunity.  
Narrative Regarding Economic Opportunity as a Service 
In my research, I discuss economic opportunity as a service. The availability of jobs, the 
location of jobs, and ability for a person to support him or herself monetarily contributes to 
livability. Both planners and government officials’ narrative are that COD is located in an area 
that is beneficial for residents to seek employment opportunities. Both government officials, 
Khalil and Samir, and one planner, David Sims, draw attention to the two major roads located 
around COD. David Sims is an American economist and planner who has worked in developing 
countries for nearly 50 years. Sims has worked as an advisor and consultant on issues 
pertaining to housing, land management, finance, and community development. He currently 
resides in Cairo. These respondents see these roads as access to opportunity. However, this 
narrative implies that residents in COD already have the resources and means, such as a 
personal vehicle or taxi, to utilize them. 
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It is very clean, big, in the heart of Cairo -Khalil 
It’s located in between two major roads of Cairo -Samir 
It is well located. As we know, poor people need to be near multiple possibilities of 
employment and petty trade. So, location, location, location -Sims 
One planner revealed a gap in some residents’ ability to make a sufficient income.  
When they see a visitor coming to visit to bury dead one, and when they come, he is 
always asking for charity -Abdullah 
Abdullah is drawing attention to the lack of economic stability some residents in COD 
face. Conversely, Amir, an urban and landscape planner, believes that business in COD is one 
of the main reasons people still live in the site today. One way that COD’s residents are able to 
economically provide for themselves is by using tombs and empty spaces to store products that 
are for sale. The tomb areas serve as a free storehouse, which helps residents make a larger 
profit by not paying rent to use the space. However, the government does not support this and 
is actively trying to prohibit this.  
COD is the perfect place to distribute products because many store their products for free 
within -Khalil 
The government is in the process of prohibiting this -Khalil 
Overall, there are two prevailing narratives regarding tomb dweller’s economic 
opportunity. One is that residents have a sufficient way to make a living and the other is that 
they do not. Government officials point to the prime location of COD and the surrounding major 
roads as a way for making a living. However, they frown upon the way current residents are 
making a living within COD.  
This section establishes that infrastructure and services give structures the ability to be a 
place for someone to live. Service provision is ultimately the state’s responsibility. We know that 
the government has provided service upgrades to the area. However, half have access to 
running water within their dwelling, only one quarter of residents have electricity, and fewer have 
access to a sanitation system (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). Some families are using these services 
illegally, while some have legally obtained them. Respondents have established COD is well 
located and that residents could seek opportunities outside of the cemeteries. But what about 
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inside COD? Literature and news articles describe isolated areas where one or two schools are 
located, one post office, a couple of schools and medical facilities are located. This is not 
enough to serve the entire tomb community. The role urban planners can play in bridging the 
gap between housing and service provision is vital (Tiwari & Hingorani, 2013). The government 
in Cairo currently allows residents to formally obtain water, electricity, and sewage by going to a 
ministry building and requesting it. However, the initials fees may be too expensive for COD’s 
residents. Residents typically inhabit tombs that are already serviced. However, the lack of 
services limit newcomers. Perhaps this is the government’s intention, due to the gap in 
understanding that COD can be an option for affordable living. Housing and service provision 
must be integrated (Tiwari & Hingorani, 2013). Cairo’s government has provided some 
infrastructure but has not altered their view, or narrative, surrounding this site as housing. It is 
my position that the existence of services elevates a space into a place to live, and COD has 
such services. Though it can be argued that the intention behind initially installing infrastructure 
in COD was to serve those mourning their loved ones for a short period of time, the use has 
evolved. The infrastructure now serves a community that is constantly present.  
Community 
“A large group of houses can make a "neighborhood" if the people who live there bring 
to it the elements of intimate association and a unity of interest” -Abrams, 1966, p.9 
This quote pulled from Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World written by 
Charles Abrams points out how people are a necessary component in making something a 
place to live. He specifies that a cluster of houses transform into a community with people who 
interact with one another and have unifying commonalities (Abrams, 1966). A community is 
made up of residents who help residents experience a feeling of belonging. This is fostered 
through gatherings, celebrations, mealtimes, recreation, or other organic meet ups. For the 
urban poor, social ties and community networks are especially important (Fahmi & Sutton, 
2014). 
While discussing the difficulties that come with upgrading an informal housing site, one 
government official admits that there is a society of people in COD who are well-connected and 
established in the area.  
People grow up living there and they do not own the land, but they are existing there. 
They are a society there. They are very connected to there -Samir  
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Samir’s acknowledgment of this is significant because he is a high-ranking government 
official who deals with plans concerning whether or not informal residents are evicted and 
relocated. Such decisions ultimately affect a community’s collective happiness. Yet the strong 
social patterns in COD are not easily understood by outsiders, including policy makers. This is 
in part to the wall between Al-Azhar Park and the Bab al-Wazir section of the cemetery that acts 
as a physical barrier between COD and the rest of Cairo. Additionally, there is a police force 
within the cemetery that monitors interaction between residents and foreigners. There are also 
prejudices and misconceptions that outsiders hold towards those living in COD that keep 
outsiders from really understanding the social dynamics. Academic and consultant May al-
Ibrashy believes that one of the biggest threats to COD is “the stigma attached to the cemetery 
due to its perception as a place of shame and as a manifestation of Cairo’s economic and urban 
problems” (2013, p.66). Anna Tozzi Di Marco explains this is especially true for rural migrants 
who now call the City of the Dead home.  
“It is worthwhile to note how the dominant language of political power has confined all 
the poor immigrants to the cemetery and how it has manipulated the relationship between 
rurality and urbanity by dichotomizing them. The negative cable attached to the rural 
people - as being poor, ignorant, superstitious, straying from the true religion and so on - 
is intended to marginalize the City of the Dead’s community.” -Tozzi Di Marco, 2011, 
p.39 
Sarah El-Rashdi’s Abram Online article gives voice to a political sociologist at the 
American University in Cairo named Said Sadek who affirms that resident’s stuffer from the 
stigma outsiders, particularly middle- and upper-class Cairenes, attach to living in the cemetery. 
The same article shares an anecdote from a tomb dweller who explains that a relative’s 
engagement ended once her soon-to-be spouse learned she lived in the City of the Dead.  
"My sister’s ex-fiancé broke off their engagement once he found out where we live” -
Khaloud, a resident in COD from source El Rashdi, 2013  
Additionally, one of the stronger and more commonly held narratives by outsiders about 
COD is that only criminals and mentally ill people live there. 
“It has been described as a cancerous growth in the body of the city and its residents are 
stigmatized as outlaws and degenerates” -al Ibrashy, 2013, p.66 
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These sources here confirm that because interactions between tomb dwellers and 
outsiders is somewhat limited, the negative narrative about who lives in COD persists. This 
frays the community that could be had between those who live in the cemetery and those who 
do not. We know that outsiders utilize the space within COD for economic gain (i.e driving 
schools, construction supply shops, and car maintenance services), but are these people also 
coming to get to know the people who make up the tomb communities? It is doubtful.  
Not only should outsiders attempt to understand the social dynamics of COD but so too 
should planners and researchers. Masterplan Cairo 2050 is criticized for not focusing on the 
social costs of bulldozing informal housing. Demolishing physical structures also ends the social 
ties that tomb dwellers have made. David Sims is quoted in the Egypt Independent article 
written by Christopher Reeve regarding the criticism about Cairo 2050’s proposal to relocate 
informal settlers.  
“The main critique is the huge amount of displacement involved,” Sims says, “but also a 
complete unconcern for the majority of poor existing and future inhabitants.” -David 
Sims from source Reeve, 2011 
Communal Relationship Between the Living and the Dead and Spiritual Practices 
Another interesting aspect of community that most are unconcerned about is the living’s 
relationship with the dead. This relationship is evident even in the name the City (a word 
representing life) of the Dead (death). Some Egyptians do believe that living close to the dead 
will bring blessings in the afterlife. Other choose to live in COD to be near their deceased family 
members (El Rashdi, 2013). As a planner, I value the needs of the living more than I do the 
dead, as you will read in my planning suggestions for this site. But perhaps what is needed by 
the living is to feel closer to family members who have departed.  
A 47-year-old woman living in COD was quoted in a Reuters article by journalist and 
photographer Asmaa Waguih published in 2015. The woman explains that the communal 
relationship between those who are living in the necropolis and those who are buried there is 
less burdensome than communing with the living.  
"Living with the dead is very easy and comfortable - It’s the people who are living who 
harm you" - Nassra Muhamed Ali, a resident in COD from source Waguih, 2015  
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According to the quote, Nassra Muhamed Ali finds a sense of comfort from living among 
the departed. This resident’s positive feelings about living in close proximity with the dead 
should not be placed on all residents, as some are uncomfortable with “sleeping with the dead 
beneath (their) feet” (al- Ibrashy, 2005, p. 227). Regardless of feelings, there is a spiritual 
relationship between the living and the dead that is present at all times.   
In the City of the Dead there exists a small sect of women, mostly rural migrants, who 
practice magic-religious rituals associated with the zar cult. Zar rituals are intended to cure 
illnesses caused by supernatural spirits, or demons, that are said to control someone’s body. 
Zar rituals are different than an exorcism because the spirit is not commanded to leave by zar 
leaders but rather the ritual is preformed to ensure a favorable relationship between the sprit 
and its host body. Private zar rituals are sometimes held in the homes of tomb dwellers. It 
should be noted that the practices of the zar cult are not exclusive to residents in the City of the 
Dead. Zar rituals have also been practiced elsewhere in Egypt and also in Sudan (Tozzi di 
Marco, 2011). It is unclear exactly how many residents in COD partake in zar rituals, but it is 
clear that the presence of such practices adds a spiritual component to the cemetery that is not 
necessarily associated with the bodies buried below them.  
Family Became Community 
Family dynamics are important in all of the Muslim world, but it seems to run even 
deeper among tomb dwellers. The social dynamics of COD are the most documented in the 
context of family, particularly in interviews with tomb dwellers produced by news outlets. Many 
young wives followed their husbands to COD thinking their living situation would be temporary 
until they were still living in the same tomb area after their children had children (Nedoroscik, 
1997). To briefly continue the point of COD being seen as a temporary housing solution, in the 
film Karakon fe al-sharea (نوكارك ىف عراشلا), a family loses their home, and the husband struggles 
to provide shelter for his family. In the midst of that struggle, the family lives in the City of the 
Dead temporarily. The film is mostly lighthearted, but it showcases the family impatiently hoping 
to leave. Eventually they make their way out. For the characters in the movie, COD was a 
temporary solution. But for third generation tomb dwellers now living in COD (Fahmi & Sutton, 
2014), the cemetery became a community through the growing of families. Urban planners and 
government respondents for this research underscore this point. 
Maybe a citizen in this area becomes familiar with the area because they become 
established in these areas and have their family in this area -Samir  
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These guards with their families are settled in there. So, these guards have evolved and 
made families and did their living there -Abdullah  
 The City of the Dead has been perceived as “symbolic internal otherness” and this is 
evident in the way the public continues to stigmatize tomb dwellers (Tozzi Di Marco, 2011, 
p.49). As a result, powerful interests still want to destroy this site and are using historical 
monuments and cultural aspects as a gateway to do so.  
Historical/Cultural  
The City of the Dead has been around since the start of Cairo and is revered for its 
impressive monuments and graves which shape the urban fabric (Nedoroscik, 1997). The 
religious value of particular shrines and sites of visitation is ‘unparalleled in Egypt’ (al Ibrashy, 
2013). Sites of significance honor religious figures, Sufi masters, political rulers, and local 
influencers (al Ibrashy, 2013). Government official Khalil adds that there are official sites for 
martyrs, the armed forces, and for the royal family. Because of these significant sites, Khalil 
sees how turning COD into a sort of Islamic tourist site would be beneficial.  
These places could be used as an Islamic tourist site. Hopefully this particular 
development in these particular burial sites will have an impact on the surrounding 
sections -Khalil  
Religious Tourism 
Upgrading the site for religious tourism is an option that is talked about frequently. A 
study by academic and planning consultant May al- Ibrashy advocates preservation and minor 
upgrades for COD as an urban regeneration strategy in Cairo. May al-Ibrashy recognizes there 
is not a one-size-fits-all solution for the cemeteries, especially for preventing decay of the 
historic urban fabric and for enhancing the socio-economic conditions in this area. One way to 
achieve both of these goals for COD, however, could be to focus on its usage as a religious and 
cultural destination for local and international tourists (al Ibrashy, 2013). Through conversations 
with respondents, I learned that Cairo’s government is interested in upgrading the site for 
religious tourism.  
The Egyptian government has taken a new approach to historical sites - instead of 
deserting them they are using them -Khalil  
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Recently, the Egyptian government is planning seriously to improve and upgrade the City 
of the Dead, and the entry point of such is to look at the sacred places and historical 
places -Khalil  
However, the government’s intentions do not stop there. Upgrading COD as a religious 
and cultural destination is merely a stepping stone in a larger plan to create a business park. In 
order to fully understand how the historical narrative is being used at the expense of the 
planning narrative, we must take a look at what is known of the long-term plan implementation 
goals for COD. Samir Mahmoud, a high-ranking government official in Egypt’s General 
Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) shared:  
The first plan for five and ten years is that this would be a public park. And bit by bit we 
would try to move the remainder of the bodies of the families would be translated 
[meaning transferred] to another area. So, this will take time. During this time, we can 
say that this is a historical garden, and after those ten years we can try to invest in the 
areas that are suitable for investment. It is not an easy task… This is because the first five 
years you are not allowed to use this area again because of the negative connotations for 
the people. So, we can try to convert this area to small gardens - over time into a larger 
garden, so it’s a long-term plan -Samir 
Samir shares also that during this long period of development, the cemetery will become 
an extension of Al Azhar Park before it becomes a business park.  
And because we have a successful model [referring to Al Azhar Park], we want to extend 
this model…. In terms of the vision of this area to convert this area into a park, it is not 
only for the public, it is also a business park -Samir  
Samir says that development will initially be done in the name of historic preservation 
because COD will start out as a “historical garden” after the bodies have been transferred to 
another area. Once the social stigma of relocating the dead goes away (a minimum of five years 
according to Samir), development will proceed. Upgrading the site to make it more welcoming 
and suitable for religious tourists is one thing but using that to kick start a ten-year development 
plan for a business park is taking advantage of the historical and cultural narrative. Either way, 
narratives that exist for the City of the Dead are being ignored. Planners were criticized for 
Masterplan 2050 because of the way it did not fully disclose demolition and relocation details for 
both residents and the deceased. If high-rise development is the goal, planners must be clear 
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about it. It is important to note that the same respondent who described the business park plans 
does acknowledge the challenges that come with planning for a site with deep cultural and 
religious value.  
We face a problem that this area has a scatter of buildings that have deep culture and 
value. But this is a problem because it’s not only a cemetery it’s a complex: a cemetery, 
housing, and also mosques and other cultural sites. -Samir  
You have different culture and historical sites, and if we try to change this area we should 
care about those things.  -Samir  
Though the complexities are acknowledged, plans are being drafted. The entry point for 
upgrading this site is through its historical features. The cultural and historical sites in the City of 
the Dead are not as important to planners as the other economic activities that could be 
capitalized on surrounding the site. When asked how likely is it that these plans will come to 
fruition in the next five years Amir Gohar gives a mixed message.  
I think it is less likely for lots of cultural reasons. There will be lots of resistance from the 
people. However, the near [meaning similar] experiences with other informal areas shows 
that they only have the guts and the strength and don’t care about the social costs if there 
is a developer or investor who is willing to improve the area -Amir 
Amir is saying that the social cost of going against what the public wants does not 
concern powerful interests if there is money to be made. While Amir is not currently located in 
Cairo, nor is he a decision-maker for the site, his insight is keen because he understands the 
nuances that come with planning in Egypt, and he has witnessed profit oriented development 
prescribed by Egypt’s government while growing up in the Greater Cairo Region. When asked 
what the City of the Dead might look like in 30 years, Amir gave a more straightforward answer.   
I think in 30 years the hope doesn’t change things as much as the market value. So in 30 
years this piece of land will be very, very expensive. A lot more expensive. There will be 
a lot more demand on it. Everything surrounding this area and the Nile will be highly 
developed. In a high-rise Dubai-sized urban. That will increase its value to the extent that 
will make the government interfere or real estate developers to take it and build to 
transfer it to something else. So, I don’t think it will last another 30 years. They are 
already demolishing our cultural heritage. Imagine the City of the Dead -Amir 
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Ultimately, Amir hopes that people living in COD find a better livelihood and a better 
urban area to live in and move out. Amir hopes that the function for COD becomes exclusively a 
cemetery with more green space around the historic monuments. He hopes that it becomes 
“just the City of the Dead” *emphasis added. While this narrative does not honor COD as a 
place to live, it does honor the historical narrative. Most respondent’s knee-jerk reaction about 
the history and culture in COD is one of praise and admiration.  
Some is really interesting and really beautiful. -Abdullah  
The ancient aspect and point of view is really amazing. -Abdullah  
Not only planners and historic preservationists but everyday citizens are also concerned 
about preserving the historic narrative of COD. 
“People interested in the Islamic architectural heritage revealed their concern about 
preserving the historical monuments, particularly within Bab El-Nasr Cemetery, for both 
Cairo's residents and for tourists… Generally, for them the demolition of the cemeteries 
will destroy part of Cairo's historic past” (Fahmi & Sutton, 2014). 
While this may disappoint residents and those hoping to preserve the historic narrative 
of this site, based on my interview with Samir Mahmoud, the demolition of tomb structures and 
relocating the deceased is part of the plan for upgrading the City of the Dead.   
Urban Fabric 
Low Density and Gridded Streets 
Unlike most informal settlements across the globe (Berner, 2001), the City of the Dead 
has a low density. The City of the Dead is not overly crowded or congested. Because this 
informal settlement is also a cemetery, it sits on a gridded street pattern, unlike other informal 
areas in the Greater Cairo Region. Respondent Amir Gohar underscores the differences 
between the City of the Dead and other informal settlements in Cairo based on their urban 
fabrics.  
There are streets. Yes, they’re not asphalt, and they are not paved, but there is layout. 
There is a grid pattern… the informal areas, are what is called ashwaiyyat, doesn’t have 
that clear pattern of street network or movement. It follows the navigation system that it 
was built on initially. So, there is a big difference in the urban fabric, even if there are 
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similarities in people’s adjustments of the space and in the social behavior in both. But 
the urban morphology is very different -Amir 
The open spaces in the cemetery allow for sunlight and airflow, which contributes to a 
better quality of living and better health conditions, according to one contributor for the Egyptian-
German Participatory Development Programme study. This study provides perspective from 
multiple stakeholders invested in the livelihood of informal settlements in Egypt. One such 
stakeholder works at a small medical center near COD and shares that residents in COD may 
be healthier than those in other poor areas in GCR because it is less crowded and less polluted.  
“People here may be poorer than in other popular areas, but in fact they seem to be 
healthier,” she explains. The reason might be that the area is less crowded, and the level 
of stress, pollution, and noise is not as high as in other poor areas.” -Howeidy et al., 2009, 
p.68 
Urban planner Abdullah and government official Khalil rightly understand how CODs 
urban fabric acts similar to an urban growth boundary, preserving low density inside the city.  
In a way it is very ironic, it is helping regulate Cairo in a way. If it was an empty piece of 
land, we would have much more crowded Cairo. But now with downtown, Islamic Cairo, 
it is a buffer zone rather than another urban area. In a way, it is governing the growth of 
Cairo.  -Khalil  
The most intrinsic value of these sites is the very low density -Abdullah  
Adding Major Connecting Roads Seen as a Disruption 
Roads inside the cemeteries forming a grid pattern are valued by Amir, Khalil and David 
Sims. However, one planner brings up that while the gridded street system inside COD is 
noteworthy, building roads, such as Selah Salem Highway, that lead into the cemetery disrupts 
the lives of tomb dwellers.   
I hope to stop cars going into this place because it is really having a bad effect. This is the 
way that when you introduce cars to these areas you are making road facilities and 
enforcing these areas and lands to change. I think we should not enforce the change. -
Abdullah 
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These roads connect COD to the rest of Cairo. While some might say this is beneficial 
for tomb dwellers because of access to economic and educational opportunities among other 
needs, they are primarily utilized by Egyptians who do not live in the cemetery.  
It has so many roads in it. It is a daily route for so many Egyptians. They go to their work 
or go back to their homes they have to drive by the City of the Dead -Khalil  
Abdullah adds that the roads also make a way for outsiders to come into the cemetery to 
mourn their loved ones and also because the open spaces provide an experience that is difficult 
to find elsewhere.  
Some people go there to have some memories. Going for an open space because they 
have small densities. A lot of people have their memories with their relatives. It is a really 
nice and remarkable thing to have these areas and within the city -Abdullah  
Courtyards  
The private courtyards next to tombs are what make the urban fabric so distinct. Private, 
unroofed space is a luxury that is almost exclusively enjoyed by the wealthy in the Greater Cairo 
Region. Courtyards are seen as an amenity among residents because they provide a space for 
gathering, work, and leisure. The following supplementary sources present visual snapshots of 
residents doing simple, ordinary activities such as housework and playing board games in the 
courtyards. Figures 9 and 10 were taken by Asmaa Waguih while working for Reuters, an 
international news organization. The series of images were posted in an article titled “Living in 
the City of the Dead” (Waguih, 2015). Figure 9 depicts a woman washing clothes near her home 
in the Necropolis, and Figure 10 depicts a barber giving a man a shave next to someone’s burial 
site.  
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Figure 9: A woman washing her clothes (Asmaa Waguih, 2015). 
 
Figure 10: A man getting a shave from a barber in the open space of COD (Asmaa Waguih, 
2015).  
77 
Figures 9 and 10 do a good job of showing us the proximity in which the living do daily 
life next to the dead. This photo shows the open-air space that the courtyard provides next to 
the built structure intended for families to come mourn the life of a loved one yet used for 
everyday activities.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Children using the courtyard for recreation (Abdul- Hadi, 2009). 
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Figure 12: Two men playing chess in the open courtyard (Nesbitt, 2000). 
Figures 11 and 12 depict people having fun in their community by playing ball games 
and dominos. The courtyards in Figures 11 and 12 look clean and well-kept. The urban fabric of 
this space allows residents the opportunity to enjoy everyday tasks outside, which may be 
helpful considering many informal dwellings are overcrowded.  
A Quiet Space and Prime Location  
Amir Gohar and David Sims agree the one minor upgrade COD could use is adding 
more green space, particularly trees. Sims says COD is quieter than other districts in Cairo like 
Zamalek39, for example. Julia Gerlach, a contributor to the Egyptian-German Participatory 
 
39 Zamalek is an affluent district in Western Cairo, separating downtown Cairo from Giza 
79 
Development Programme study also empathizes that this city within the city is one of the only 
places someone can truly enjoy the feeling of being alone.  
“Cairo is a noisy, crowded city. Being alone is therefore a rare occurrence, and one of the 
very few places where one can enjoy this feeling is in the City of the Dead” -Julia 
Gerlach from source Howeidy et al., 2009, p.67 
Umm Khaled, the same resident who was referenced in the Services section of this 
paper for approving of her infrastructure and service provision in the cemetery also agrees that 
the quietness is an asset to her community.  
“We are a nice little community, and we know that people like the silence and serenity of 
our area” -Umm Khaled, a resident in COD from source Howeidy et al., 2009, p.67-68 
More specifically, she confirms respondent Abdullah’s comment that people from other 
parts of Cairo take advantage of this, too. She does not find it odd that people come to the COD 
not only for holidays but also just to walk around (Howeidy et al., 2009) One resident 
interviewed in the already mentioned Reuters article by Asmaa Waguih points out one downside 
to the quietness. The resident believes that people take advantage of the area by going into the 
City of the Dead to do illegal activities.  
“Some from outside the neighborhood use the graves to deal drugs, with theft also an 
issue” -Nassra Muhamed Ali, a resident in COD from source Waguih, 2015 
This same article gives a different, unnamed woman’s narrative about the peaceful open 
space of her residence in COD. When she visits her two daughters who live in a different 
informal settlement in Greater Cairo, the woman is reminded of her appreciation for the “space 
and tranquility” of her tomb dwelling (Waguih, 2015) Quiet goes a long way in a city inhibited by 
20 million, especially when you can find it in the city center. This is one of the reasons residents 
continue to live in the cemeteries today. Government official Khalil Shaat believes CODs prime 
location is an asset.  
The City of the Dead is located in a prime location in the heart of Cairo -Khalil 
CODs location in the heart of Cairo is an asset for informal dwellers, however, this asset 
could be the reason residents are forced to relocate, with or without a relocation package from 
the government. Should the monuments be demolished for the sake of development, the urban 
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fabric will evolve into a dense urban area that matches the loud and tall structures that exist in 
the city center. 
Planning 
Cairo 2050 
In 2007-08, Cairo 2050 was published in the form of a PowerPoint presentation 
containing 199 slides. It was produced by Egypt's General Organization for Physical Planning 
(GOPP). Cairo 2050 called for making the city less crowded by redistributing citizens into the 
surrounding desert. It essentially saw urban sprawl as the solution. The vision also called for 
creating grand boulevards, adding more green space, and building large gated communities. 
Those projects would require displacing millions of residents, and the plan did not include 
details on what that process might look like. Cost estimates were also left out of the vision. 
Many plans were set to be complete by 2020, including plans to alter COD. By 2010, 
information about Cairo 2050 became more accessible online. Planners, researchers, activists, 
and residents became disappointed because of its failure to elaborate on details. By the 
following year, Cairo 2050 was dismissed as only a “dream” or “vision” by the government. 
Respondent David Sims confirms this.  
What you know about 2050 is only a PowerPoint. As a matter of fact, it is not referred to 
by the government -Sims 
Egypt 2052 
It is important to note that the Arab Spring, a series of uprisings and anti-government 
protests, took place from 2010 to 2012. In 2012, a revised plan called Egypt 2052 was in the 
works and was published in 2014 by the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities. 
Egypt 2052 called for upgrading slums and other informal areas to “develop these settlements 
and improve the quality of life of the residents” (2052 Plan, 2014, p, 42). Egypt 2052 goes on to 
say that upgrading informal areas has a number of positive impacts including “efficient use of 
resources, particularly land; decreasing the percent of deprived population; and environmental 
conservation and regeneration” (2052 Plan, 2014, p, 42). The following bit from the 2052 plan 
discusses the amount of informal areas within GCR and the intentions to upgrade or demolish 
them.  
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“There are about 1,171 informal areas within and around Egyptian cities. An estimated 17 
percent are upgraded, and another 58 percent are currently under upgrading processes. 
Another 22 percent will be upgraded within the current fiscal five-year plan. Areas that 
upgrading seems to be an unfeasible solution are, or will be, cleared to avail areas for 
open green areas to serve members of the community” -2052 Plan, 2014, p.42 
More specific percentages are given in a chart in the planning document. According to 
the chart, 17.40% of 1,171 informal areas have already been upgraded. 58.30% of 1,171 
informal areas were in the upgrading stage as of 2014 with 21.80% to be upgraded within the 
next five-year fiscal plan, meaning upgrades should be complete already. The remaining ~3% of 
the 1,171 areas have either been demolished, are currently under demolition, or have not been 
accounted for. From interviews presented by government official Samir Mahmoud in the 
Historical/Culture section of this paper, we know that the plans for COD involve clearing the 
cemetery for “open green areas.”  
The plan briefly qualifies an informal area as either unsafe or unplanned (2052 Plan, 
2014). A map is provided to show where the informal areas are in the Greater Cairo Region. 
Unsafe areas in the map are color-coded red and unplanned areas are brown. According to the 
map which is shown in Figure 13, the City of the Dead is “unplanned.”  
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Figure 13: A map from Cairo 2052 plan highlighting urban informality in Cairo. COD is the large 
brown cluster in the middle of the map, and it is considered “unplanned” (2052 Plan, 2014, p. 
42). 
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Unplanned areas, according to the Egypt 2052, are “illegally planned by inhabitants and 
suffer from very high density, and lack of basic urban services and accessibility or connectivity 
with formal fabric” (2052 Plan, 2014, p.43). This work has established that the history of 
inhabitants and structures built for uses other than funerary functions within the cemeteries 
suggests that COD was not illegally planned by inhabitants. The previous section regarding 
CODs urban fabric discusses the low density and health benefits that residents enjoy because 
of that. We know that some residents feel like they have adequate service provision, but this 
study does acknowledge that service upgrades would make COD more livable. Finally, COD is 
in the heart of Cairo. It is accessible and connected to the “formal” fabric. Not only does this 
description of “unplanned” areas assume that formal and informal areas are entirely separate 
from one another, it places COD in a box it does not belong in. Egypt 2052 does provide a list of 
strategies to upgrade unplanned areas.  
“The strategy towards these areas is to increase their accessibility through opening main 
roads and corridors with minimum demolition; provide alternative housing units for 
affected groups from opening roads within the same area or nearby or direct 
compensation based on consultation; no eviction for affected groups before providing 
alternatives; Regularizing properties and enabling security of tenure within these areas 
based on detailed development plan; Provide basic services on vacant plots/pockets 
within the areas” -2052 Plan, 2014, p.43  
These suggested strategies read as a one-size-fits-all solution. It is safe to assume that 
this list of strategies may not be tailored for the specific needs of the different types of informal 
settlements in GCR either, but fully unpacking that is beyond the scope of this study. It should 
be mentioned that the 2052 plan does allocate one page to describe a housing self-help 
program that the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development (MHUUD) formulated, 
though it does not say how this program might be applied to informal areas moving forward. The 
plan also speaks of participatory practices but is still missing key action steps or details on what 
type of particularly planning might occur. There are levels of effectiveness to participatory 
planning. On a spectrum regarding the most successful participatory planning practices is what 
Sherry Arnstein, one of the most influential writers on planning participation, calls “citizen 
power”. “It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded 
from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future” (Arnstein, 
1969, p.216). On the opposite end is the most unhelpful form which involves powerful interests 
manipulating vulnerable populations by “informing” them that they are both the problem and 
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responsible for the problem. This is essentially a form of “non-participation.” Somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum is when powerful interests claim that all sides, including those from 
vulnerable populations, are heard but their words and suggestions are not heeded (Arnstein, 
1969). This practice checks all of the “responsible planner” boxes but maintains the status quo. 
There exists commentary, or narrative, regarding the effectiveness of Egypt 2052 in a 
report published in 2017 by lecturer and academic Akram Youssef. His report concludes by 
calling for stakeholders to update the 2052 plan because of the unlikelihood that it can be 
implemented in a sustainable way (Youssef, 2017). Youssef presents a brief list of suggestions 
for an updated plan that might make it more achievable. One such suggestion is to improve the 
gap between the action plans and strategies given in the plan by being clearer about 
stakeholders’ roles for the development process. He also suggests that implementation must be 
monitored and evaluated in order to know what was achieved (Youssef, 2017). In short, 
Youssef’s narrative regarding Egypt 2052 is that it is not detailed, and the lack of follow-up 
ensures that implementation will be unsuccessful.  
Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt Vision 2030 
A separate plan was launched in 2016 called The Sustainable Development Strategy: 
Egypt Vision 2030. It is nearly 400 pages long and promotes itself as a guide to help Egypt 
become a more advanced and prosperous nation that is economically and socially just (2030 
Vision, 2016). The plan’s vision statement reads: 
“By 2030, Egypt will be a country with a competitive, balanced, and diversified 
economy, depending on knowledge and creativity, and based on justice, social 
integration, and participation, with a balanced and varied ecosystem, a country that uses 
the genius of the place and the citizens in order to achieve sustainable development and 
improve the quality of the life for all. Moreover, the government looks forward to lifting 
Egypt, through this strategy, to a position among the top 30 countries in the world, in 
terms of economic development indicators, fighting corruption, human development, 
market competitiveness, and the quality of life.” (2030 Vision, 2016, p.3). 
The plan outlines the challenges Egypt faces regarding housing:  
− Expanding gap between population needs and the available supply of housing  
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− High housing prices for middle-income households, especially with their slight  
increase in incomes and the increasing number of homeless people  
− The relative increase in the cost of building housing  
− Slow-moving procedures and their complexity to obtain licenses from specific 
authorities 
− Low incentives to rent unused units  
− The poor condition of housing units that are rented according to the old rent 
system  
− Increasing phenomenon of slums and the lack of a comprehensive and effective 
solution to address slums  
− Obstacles preventing growth of the mortgage market  
− Continuous decrease in land suitable for building, which led to a significant 
increase  
in the price of land and expansion onto agricultural areas  
− Migration of the population, especially young people, to the capital and major 
cities 
(2030 Vision, 2016, p.35). 
Plans for housing provision are specified for many of the newly sprawled cities extending 
into the deserts of GCR; however, there is little mention about what might happen to existing 
informal settlements in this particular plan. Neither plans for unsafe or unplanned housing are 
mentioned in the document. This plan is more focused on the informal economy than it is 
informal housing. In May 2019, the planning ministry held a workshop to discuss ways to update 
the 2030 plan. Participants were divided into five groups and each group discussed solutions 
and recommendations for a new, updated plan. Some of the recommendations for the updated 
plan were to add information about increasing investments in railway and river transport, making 
better use of vacant lands, boosting education, and offering more job opportunities (el Bakry, 
2019), most of which continue the focus on economic development. The minister of planning is 
quoted in an article by the Brussels Research Group, a research firm that focuses on foreign 
policy and global economies, for saying that Egypt is “on track” for implementing Vision 2030. In 
fact, the minister says progress is ahead of schedule specifically regarding social housing 
projects and the new city extensions (Brussels Research Group, 2019). Many have criticized the 
housing extensions because the difficulties of housing provision and issues surrounding social 
justice for informal residents are being ignored.  
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New Plans, Same Motives 
Out of the many visions that Egypt and Cairo have produced in the last decade, Cairo 
2050 is the most discussed in academic literature and media outlets. Perhaps this is because 
the logic and intent behind it permeates current planning process, according to secondary 
source Tadamun (2014). I want to explore this claim in terms of what the plans for the City of 
the Dead are today. On pages 35 and 36 of the Cairo 2050 PowerPoint, there are a list of basic 
principles that guide the vision. I have pulled out four principles relevant to this research that still 
apply. After each principle, I have included quotes from my primary data interviews that 
reinforce the goals of 2050, though 2050 is dismissed as only a “dream” for Cairo today.   
#6. “upgrade poor, deteriorate and informal existing areas, provide new adequate residential areas 
compatible with government plans to limit informal zones in order to create good and health 
society” -2050 Masterplan, 2008 
So hopefully when they [tomb dwellers and those living in ashwayaat] are relocated to a 
proper housing site where they have proper schooling, proper facility, proper youth 
center, property cultural sites, proper garden where they can go and spend some time I 
believe that this will impact their life definitely in a positive manner -Khalil 
#10. “create green grid from green areas and parks to upgrade living condition” -2050 
Masterplan, 2008 
So in terms of the green corridor network, there is a proposal to link Fustat40 with Al-
Azhar Park -Samir   
#12. “identify and create a network of investment projects (culture, administration, tourism, religious, 
social) in order to attract investors and implement projects of 2050 Vision with their participation and 
integration” -2050 Masterplan, 2008 
In Egypt next year we will have two major events: we will have the integration of the 
Great Museum in the Pyramids and the Culture Museum. The government is taking 
serious actions within the urban planning context and within the tourism and culture 
context and to the transportation roles and new tunnels and entrances to the pyramids and 
 
40 Fustat is an area in Cairo close to the Nile River. This area was the first capital of Egypt under Muslim rule. Cairo 
eventually replaced Fustat as the capital of Egypt. Fustat is located within what is now Cairo, only 4 miles from 
Al Azhar Park and the Bab al Wazir portion of COD 
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new upgrading some of the informal area…. Part of the issue is basically the City of the 
Dead around the Culture Museum. That’s basically the first geographic zone that they are 
working on -Khalil  
#13. “implement existing and approved mega projects as priority projects due to their regional and 
national importance such as relocation of ministries and public intuitions outside the core of the city” -
2050 Masterplan, 2008 
The real estate industry, GOPP, and the new urban communities authority all feel like the 
future of Cairo is out in the desert -Sims 
One of the reasons for building a new administration in the desert is to improve the heart 
of Cairo. Improve on to try to demolish most of the unsuitable uses in Cairo such as the 
ministries, …the cemetery, all of these unsuitable places -Samir  
The fact that the logic and intent behind Cairo 2050 is still present in upcoming plans is 
evident in the way planners and government officials explain Cairo’s current plans (though 
specific plans such as Egypt 2052 or Vision 2030 are rarely mentioned in my interviews with 
respondents). Figures 14 and 15 show two images from Cairo 2050 depicting the proposed 
development for the cemetery area near Al Azhar Park.  
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Figure 14: Map of plans to transfer tombs out of COD reads “cemeteries to be transferred from 
the city centre’ and “the date this project will be complete is 2020” (2050 Masterplan, 2008, 
p.194).  
 
Figure 15: Map of plans to create a green corridor network connecting Fustat to Al Azhar Park in 
place of COD outlined in green (2050 Masterplan, 2008, p.123). 
According to Samir’s interview, this is still Cairo’s vision. These figures taken from Cairo 
2050 give visual context to where urban transformation is (still) intended to take place. Figure 15 
reads, “Grand Azhar Parks (Previously Salah Salem Cemeteries)” in that are that COD is today. 
Aside from these graphics and a few brief descriptions, 2050 offered little insight on how these 
plans would happen. This was one of the biggest critiques of the plan. Page 116 of Cairo 2050 
gives a bulleted list of upgrades and plans for the cemetery area near Al Azhar Park. It begins 
by proposing the creation of new cemeteries east and west of Cairo to relocate tombs to. It says 
it will compensate the owners of existing tombs. It does not indicate that all tombs and 
monuments would be removed because it suggests preserving some historical buildings and 
monuments inside the cemetery. One bullet point is given to describe the relocation process for 
residents. It reads, “Upgrading the existing housing area and construction of alternate housing 
for residents of cemetery area.” This bullet point fails to describe the process of relocation, the 
social and financial cost for residents, the logistics for moving the deceased, and the timeline of 
proposed events. The last bullet point on page 116 of the plan gives insight on why removal 
efforts are proposed for the tombs and places to live in COD.   
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“The transferred cemeteries areas are to be renovated as public open spaces, parks and 
gardens with the addition of some recreational activities (restaurants, cafeterias, small 
size hotels).” -2050 Masterplan, 2008, p.116 
Respondents had conflicting things to say about tomb demolition and relocation. When 
asked how likely it is that the tombs would be demolished the two government officials 
interviewed had conflicting thoughts.  
Most of the proposals in this area are based on demolishing the tombs, and integrating Al 
Azar Park with another park, maybe like a business park -Samir  
We will not go on to demolish [them]. But if there’s a chance to improve the area in 
accordance with the rules and regulations of religious guidelines, maybe to widen a road 
or to make a park next to the area, that’s up to the planner of that area. I’m not aware- I’m 
sure that it’s not part of their plan to demolish the religious sites. But to leave them the 
way they are - this is not acceptable for anyone -Khalil  
Samir is a stakeholder working for a sector of government making direct decisions about 
both formal and informal housing. His insight on the future plans for the site is because he is 
both a decision maker and an advisor to other high-ranking decision makers. Khalil certainly has 
insight on the future plans for Cairo, especially regarding ashwaiyyat, however, in this particular 
instance his response is based on his uncertainty and hopefulness rather than fact.   
All three of the urbanists agreed that tomb demolition was unlikely, particularly for the 
next five years.  
“Very unlikely. Extremely unlikely… There’s too many people with interest. There’s a lot 
of people who have family graves and some of them are middle class or professional 
class - old, old families. They’re not going to like it. But some of them have moved” -
Sims  
“I think it is less likely for lots of cultural reasons. There will be lots of resistance from 
the people” -Amir 
“With ordinary cemeteries, it is really hard to remove it. Because it is a sacred place, I 
think the tombs… will be reserved” -Abdullah  
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However, Amir and Abdullah share that they believe the tombs will be gone in the next 
30 years due to the government’s desire for profitable development. When I asked David Sims 
what he hopes the City of the Dead will look like in 30 years he said:  
“The same! Without any illegal high-rise that grew up due to bribery” -Sims 
All of the plans discussed in this section call for altering informal areas. While the details 
on how and when that might happen are not always spelled out in the plans, the fact that 
informality persists as a problem for both Cairo’s housing and economic sectors is evident. 
Powerful interests do not imagine informal housing as a sustainable solution. Powerful interests 
also do not categorize COD in such a way that would allow for the narrative about it to change. 
Because COD is officially considered “unplanned” in the Egyptian context, it is lumped in with 
strategies for truly unplanned areas that would not make sense for the City of the Dead even if 
implemented. For example, one strategy in Cairo 2052 for unplanned areas is to “increase their 
accessibility through opening main roads and corridors” (p. 43), yet COD is in a desirable 
location for residents because of its centrality in the city. The City of the Dead is currently 
categorized in such a way that makes it easier for powerful interests to act on a constructed 
negative narrative that can only be dealt with by top-down decision makers. To that end, it is 
interesting that Sims added that he does not want to see COD filled with high-rise development 
due to bribery in 30 years. He would not have added that to his response if it weren’t a 
legitimate possibility.   
Governance  
From Mubarak to Sisi 
Giving a complete overview of Egypt’s system of government is beyond the scope of this 
work. For the purpose of this study, I will discuss Egypt’s leadership beginning with Muhammad 
Hosni Mubarak who was president from 1981 to 2011 under an authoritarian, claimed to be 
republic, regime (Darwisheh, 2019). Month-long mass demonstrations beginning on January 25, 
2011 in Cairo’s Tahrir Square led to Mubarak’s removal from office as a result of abuse of 
power (Darwisheh, 2019). The first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, took 
office after Mubarak in 2012 but was ousted in a coup just one year later. Morsi was affiliated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood41, and though he was elected president by the people, many 
 
41 The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a missionary movement that was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. 
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feared Morsi's initial attempts to grant himself legislative and executive authority. Additionally, 
the people of Egypt saw the shaky aftermath of Arab Spring demonstrations in neighboring 
countries (such as Libya and Syria) and feared a similar outcome (Tahhan, 2018). Housam 
Darwisheh carefully articulates the political climate at the time of Morsi’s coup and the military’s 
involvement by saying, “The military in 2011 helped a popular uprising by a highly unified 
opposition to oust a dictator whereas the military in 2013 ousted a democratically elected 
president in a highly polarized political environment” (Darwisheh, 2019, p.11). Abdel Fattah al 
Sisi, Egypt’s current president, took office in 2014. Egypt’s newest constitution, adopted when 
Sisi became president, has essentially constitutionalized authoritarianism. Sisi became 
president under unique and polarized circumstances. At the time the Egyptian military was seen 
as more legitimate than ever before, while democratic institutions in Egypt were at their weakest 
(Darwisheh, 2019). Today there is little pressure for accountability and transparency in how the 
government operates. Additionally, President Sisi holds unprecedented authority over Egypt as 
a society and a nation (Darwisheh, 2019). For example, he has called the Muslim Brotherhood a 
terrorist organization and outlawed it as a political party, he has sought out an extension on his 
presidential term until 2030, he has outlawed demonstrations without prior police approval, and 
he has jailed journalists who have spoken against his presidency (Tahhan, 2018).  
Authoritarian Governance and Urban Planning  
Authoritarian governance in Egypt has only evolved since Mubarak was in office, and 
this affects the practice of urban planning in Cairo. The president of Egypt is responsible for 
appointing the governor of each governorate. The governor has executive authority over his or 
her jurisdiction and employs many to govern urban functions like public housing, street 
improvements, permit controls, cemeteries, and upkeep of public spaces (Sims, 2010). Planning 
functions of the governorate are largely dependent upon the GOPP’s discretion and budget. The 
GOPP is regulated and influenced by the central government. Respondent Amir Gohar shares 
candidly about how the City of the Dead is a reflection of the nature of the Egyptian government.  
“[COD] tells a lot about the Egyptian government. I’d like to borrow the quote I admire 
from David Sims which says, “Egypt has a strong government and weak state.” I think 
that is very articulate and very powerful … Egypt can’t control their people. They can’t 
 
MB challenges authoritarian governments in MENA by advocating for democracy. They also oppose militant 
Islamist groups. The current president of Egypt has labeled the MB as a terrorist group (Kirkpatrick, 2019) 
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control some land use zoning. They can’t clean the streets. They are very weak as a state. 
But as a government they are powerful. Anyone who is anti-government gets published. 
But anyone who is damaging the state by corruption or not respecting the zoning - they 
don’t care about it” -Amir  
Amir is referring to a chapter in David Sims’ book Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a 
City Out of Control - The following is David Sims’ narrative regarding the actions of the 
government.    
“It should be apparent that some government actions have had an important impact on the 
city, but also that for every effective action or policy there has been a host of inactions, 
false starts, suspended initiatives, and pure negligence” -Sims, 2010, p.251 
When asked what Cairo’s biggest urban planning problem is, Sims responded with:  
The government of course! -Sims  
It is important to note that while Sims unashamedly points to the government as Cairo’s 
biggest urban planning problem, the crux of his book is about considering the way Cairo 
continues to function relatively well despite the un-organization, corruption, and lack of 
transparency from the government. With this we should return to the question who is 
responsible for providing housing- the government or the resident? During my interview with 
Samir he shared that he would like to see the government take the role as organizer rather than 
sole provider of affordable housing.  
We need to think about how to provide affordable housing without a huge intervention of 
government because government should be related as just an organizer in the process -
Samir  
Some claim that the government and GOPP are more interested in monetary or political 
gain rather than addressing real issues: 
Planning authorities do not address important issues. They rather follow opportunities 
and investments -Amir  
There is an underlying desire to put Egypt to progress and look like it is progressing. -
Sims  
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The visual aspect sometimes takes over and you see it all the time. If we have a problem, 
we can just build something nice - the problem will go away. Well it’s going to go 
somewhere else. -Sims  
Government and the Current Occupation and Future Planning of COD 
This section has presented a mixture of narratives that acknowledge Egypt’s 
government as ineffective yet somehow holding things together. In terms of how this is tied to 
COD, Khalil Shaat helps us understand his narrative on the government’s current planning 
efforts for COD.  
In this particular issue you have a formula and you have many factors [to make it] formal. 
So what the government is trying to do hopefully is to take over every single issue. They 
want to the over the urban sovereignty of Cairo… They are trying to tackle the religious 
historical sites, they are trying to tackle the reviving the housing option, they are trying to 
tackle the securing and respecting the dead who are buried there, and they are trying to 
tackle and secure a decent housing solution for the people that live there illegally and in 
an improper manner -Khalil   
Though this is a description of the government tirelessly attempting to solve CODs 
“problems,” we know that ultimately it is not the vision of the government that people should live 
in COD. Yet, state corruption and lack of accountability have contributed to the current 
occupation of the COD.  
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Chapter 4 - Conclusion 
Cairo’s 20 million residents are engaged in an everyday struggle for housing that meets 
their everyday needs. Overpopulation, lack of affordable housing, and a surplus of vacant 
homes that were built for the wealthy has resulted in residents informally squatting and self-
building housing. In order to understand how particular narratives of the City of the Dead affect 
the current occupation and the future planning surrounding the site, I conducted a narrative 
analysis by interviewing 5 experts on Cairo’s current urbanism and analyzed related information 
from 23 supplemental data sources. I used a coding process for my primary interview data 
which revealed 8 themes that were repeatedly discussed during interviews among all 5 
participants. Based on those themes, I used the supplemental data to enhance or complete the 
narratives respondents shared during interviews. The supplemental data either supported or 
countered the narratives respondents held about any given theme in this work. The 8 themes 
that were explored in this work are: legality, relocation, services, community, historical/cultural, 
urban fabric, planning, and governance.  
I want to set up this final discussion by reiterating that it is my position that the City of the 
Dead is an informal settlement and a place to live. This conclusion will briefly revisit each theme 
to answer the research question posed in this work. I will also briefly discuss the importance of 
terminology for planning narratives in particular and pose an unconventional planning solution 
for COD.  
Legality  
The past and present reality that people are living in COD makes the cemetery a more 
legitimate, or legal, housing settlement. It is problematic that both planners and government 
officials either do not know or do not acknowledge the residential history of COD because this 
makes the narrative more susceptible to change. Once the cemetery was filled by the living, it 
became a place to live and at one time, this was the widely accepted narrative (Tozzi Di Marco, 
2013). That narrative changed over time as mixed land-uses that incorporated cemeteries 
became frowned upon. COD then became an example of how people can change land use and 
zoning codes to create housing that better meets their needs. The cemetery met the housing 
needs for rural migrants and the urban poor. Owners of the plots either allowed their presence 
or passively dismissed it. Generally speaking, the government has passively dismissed people 
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living in the cemetery though small demolitions have been carried out. Affirming that residents 
have, and have almost always had, a legitimate presence in COD would better honor the 
narrative of COD as a place to live.  
Relocation  
Relocation happens because a housing settlement is not seen as a place to live. 
Demolition and relocation typically happen officially on the basis of city beautification efforts 
(Berner, 2001). Across the globe, relocation settlements are too far away from original housing 
sites. This furthers issues of instability for already vulnerable populations. Because of uprooted 
economic networks, newly relocated informal residents find it difficult to get to and from a job. 
Those that have some financial means typically re-enter a sort of informal settlement. Berner 
stresses “If demolitions are unavoidable, it is crucial to have an adequate relocation site” 
(Berner, 2001, p.303). Government officials share somewhat different things about relocating 
residents. If informal settlements are built on the basis of the land’s location, why have informal 
residents in Cairo historically been relocated to a neighborhood over an hour away (driving 
distance) that requires money to get to and from sources of income? 
Services 
It is recognized by all narrative-creators considered in this work (i.e planners, 
government officials, photographers, and residents) that COD is lacking sufficient services and 
infrastructure. Some planners validate COD as a place to live despite not having adequate 
services, but these planners call for upgrades. Some residents also agree that provision of 
better services could help make COD more livable than it currently is. Government officials 
believe that infrastructure such as electricity, water, and sewage would help formalize this area. 
The government also claims it is not withholding services from those seeking them out formally. 
The question to consider here is how can urban planners improve services to make COD more 
livable? The survey data used to gage service provision for this section was published before 
the revolution/Arab spring. To get more insight on how planners can provide service upgrades, 
more contemporary survey data is needed to get a truer picture of how lacking some areas 
potentially are. 
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Community  
People are a necessary component in making something a place to live. For the urban 
poor, social ties and community networks are especially important. These networks certainly 
exist In COD and make it more livable. Unfortunately, there exists a stigma towards those who 
live in the cemetery. Outsiders have prejudices and misconceptions about tomb dwellers such 
as they are all criminals and mentally ill, particularly for rural dwellers. The current occupation of 
this site is misunderstood because it is easy to generalize something that is not familiar to us. 
Planners in Cairo must spread knowledge and awareness about who lives in COD. The social 
dynamics of COD should be explored by planners and researchers in a genuine way. Though 
not exclusively- community in COD happens through growing families. Families are a tight knit 
group amongst themselves (also due to tight living quarters) but also families interacting with 
other families creates strong social ties as neighbors. Additionally, there is a communal aspect 
among residents and the deceased, especially for those who intentionally sought out the 
cemetery to be near departed loved ones. The current occupation of this site is misunderstood 
by those planning for the site today. As a result, powerful interests still want to destroy this site 
and are using historical monuments and cultural aspects as a gateway to do so. 
Historical/ Cultural  
Short-term plans for COD require that the site becomes a historical garden during the 
time it would take to relocate the deceased to a new cemetery area. After the pressure and 
disapproval from the public weans, long-term plans will begin, and the site will become an 
extension of Al-Azhar Park and business park. The entry point for upgrading this site is through 
its historical features. It is ironic that the initial development will be done in the name of 
preserving historical sites and promoting tourism when one of the major criticisms with people 
living in COD is that they are tampering with important monuments. Yet residents are careful not 
to tamper with or make additions to their homes due to lack of money to do so. There are two 
dominant narratives being ignored here: the narrative of COD as a place to live and the 
history/culture of the site.  
Urban Fabric 
Unlike most informal settlements across the globe, the City of the Dead has a low 
density and a gridded street pattern. As a result, there are added health benefits for tomb 
dwellers because there is significant sunlight and airflow in the cemetery. This is especially true 
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in comparison to other informal settlements in Cairo. If planners were to legally establish this 
urban fabric as a sort of urban growth boundary for Cairo, the low density could be regulated to 
allow for continued views of the city from the opposite end as well as ensure those living in COD 
reap the health benefits. COD has private, unroofed courtyards that provide open space for 
residents to do everyday tasks and build community. The cemetery is also enjoyed for its 
quietness by residents and nonresidents alike. The urban fabric of COD is proof that the 
definition given to the cemetery as “unplanned” is not suitable. The cemetery is not “illegally 
planned by inhabitants and suffer[ing] from very high density, and lack of basic urban services 
and accessibility or connectivity with formal fabric” (Cairo 2052, 2014, p.43). 
Planning 
Planning is a multi-faceted practice that leaves lasting social and physical impacts on 
communities. Masterplan Cairo 2050 released as a PowerPoint in 2007-08 briefly mentions 
plans to destroy the necropolis without providing details about what that relocation process 
might look like. After receiving criticism for multiple groups, authorities dismissed Cairo 2050 as 
only a “dream” or “vision’. Subsequent plans such as Egypt 2052 and the Sustainable 
Development Strategy: Egypt Vision 2030 do surpass Cairo 2050 in length and in some ways 
detail, but the end goal in terms of housing for all three of these plans is eradicate informality. 
For the cemetery, this has meant being lumped in with the plans for “unplanned” areas that are 
not similar to COD. Planning is often driven by a singular understanding of uses which is 
particularly unhelpful for a community like COD. Additionally, one could question if it is realistic 
to plan to eradicate all informal areas in a region that is make up of more than half of the 
housing stock is informal. “Planning standards for upgrading are often unrealistically high,” says 
Berner, “this leads in turn to rising living costs and the uprooting of considerable parts of the 
population” (Berner, 2001, 296).  
Governance  
The key question to be asked here is how might COD be organized to reduce power 
imbalances? Out of all of the stakeholders, Egypt’s government has the most power to shape 
the future narrative of COD, but that does not have the be the case. Citizen power (Arnstein, 
1969) is a participatory planning option that is not bound by geography or formality. Planning 
functions are largely dependent upon the state’s budget and discretion. Egypt’s product-oriented 
planning processes showcase who is guiding and altering the narrative. It also reveals the 
motive of that process (i.e money). A bottom-up planning process, while not a magic wand, 
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would go a long way for a site like COD that is already established as a community and has 
been since arguably 969 A.D.  
Narrative Based on Terminology Used by Respondents  
One of the most important ways to understand someone’s narrative about a group of 
people or a place is to examine the words used to describe it. Here is how each respondent 
discussed those who live in COD:  
− Planner and urban consultant Abdullah Al- Attar uses words like ‘residents’ and ‘people with 
intrinsic worth’ to describe those who live in COD. In my conversations with Abdullah, he 
talks about residents with compassion and says they are people with ‘dignity’ and ‘self-
esteem’ and should be treated as such. 
− Urbanist and professor Amir Gohar also uses the word ‘residents’ to describe those who live 
in COD.  
− Economist and planner David Sims says that ‘poor people’ need to be able to access 
employment and other resources, and he says this is a reason people live in COD today. 
However, he also says that they are not ‘any different than any other people.’  
− Government official Khalil Shaat who is the advisor to the government on informal housing 
uses the term ‘inhabitants.’ Khalil does use the word ‘resident’ a couple of times in the 
interview, but he uses the term ‘inhabitants’ more frequently.  
− High-ranking government official Samir Mahmoud refers to those that live in COD as 
‘citizens’ only one time during his interview. Otherwise he used the terms ‘people’ and ‘they’. 
Here is how each respondent discussed what people were doing in COD and the 
terminology used:  
− Planner and urban consultant Abdullah Al- Attar says that people are ‘living’ in the City of 
the Dead. He also refers to the ways that COD helps residents ‘make their living’ meaning 
how it provides a way for residents to earn an income.  
− Urbanist and professor Amir Gohar says that COD is an example of how people can ‘invade’ 
a site to illegally change its land uses though this is not the predominant way Amir talks 
about how the informal settlement is used. He says people ‘live’ in COD.  
− Economist and planner David Sims says people ‘live’ in the City of the Dead, but he did not 
say this often nor talk about it passionately.  
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− Government official Khalil Shaat who is the advisor to the government on informal housing 
describes people as ‘encroaching on’ and ‘tampering with’ a burial site.  
− High-ranking government official Samir Mahmoud discusses how people are ‘living’ in COD 
but always in a negative context. He stresses that COD is a place for burial and not a place 
to live. He says that ‘living’ with the dead is a problem. This is much different than the way 
Abdullah Al- Attar talks about how people in COD are ‘living’ there and ‘making their living.’ 
Overall, both government officials spoke about people living in the City of the Dead as a 
problem needing to be solved. All three planners have differing opinions, but generally speaking 
do not view the housing function of this site as a problem needing to be solved. Abdullah Al- 
Attar holds a narrative that most closely aligns with this work. He would be interested in seeing 
minor upgrades to make COD more livable than it already is. He believes bottom-up planning 
processes would be helpful when moving forward with any plans for COD. David Sims wants to 
see the status quo stay the same in COD. Sims admits both the advantages and setbacks for 
those living in COD. He is not alarmed that hundreds of thousands live in the site today. Amir 
Gohar wants to see the site become a cemetery exclusively for the dead. Perhaps his thoughts 
align more with government officials than with Sims and Abdullah. However, it is important to 
note that Amir does not value development for the sake of making money at the expense of 
displacing residents. He values the residents of COD but values the cemetery land use more.  
The terminology used by respondents when describing COD both confirms their 
narrative about it and also shapes others’ narrative. Language is persuasive. Saying that ‘poor 
people’ are ‘encroaching’ on the City of the Dead indicates a completely different narrative from 
‘people with intrinsic worth’ are ‘living’ in the City of the Dead. Evaluating terminology used by 
major stakeholders is critical when considering the legality of a place to live because those 
stakeholders are ultimately the ones determining the legal status of that community. It is 
important to circle back to how powerful interests have tried to shape this narrative by changing 
the Egyptian definition of informal settlements, or ashwaiyyat, to no longer include the City of 
the Dead. By narrowing the definition, COD is not getting proper planning attention and it is not 
being acknowledged as a place to live. The problematic change in definition affects self-
reporting housing statistics because people may be confused about the official classification of 
their housing or people may be unaware of the changes made to the definition. This also affects 
planning policies and decisions based around these inadequate statistics.  
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Unconventional Solution 
I propose that the site should function exclusively as a community for the living, meaning 
the funerary function of this site would end and the deceased should be relocated to a new 
cemetery. It is important to note that I did not come up with ending the cemetery function of the 
site all of my own. Scholars Fahmi & Sutton (2014) have named this as a possibility. However, 
as far as I can tell, this is the first time this idea has been suggested as the primary way to move 
forward for the cemeteries. COD would become an affordable housing option without the stigma 
of living in a cemetery. The urban fabric and sound structure conditions make this a legitimate 
option. Existing infrastructure makes this a seamless and relatively cheap transition, particularly 
for the government. However, the cost of relocating tombs and who should be responsible for 
such work is difficult to say. One limitation with this solution is that some families purposely live 
on top of loved one’s gravesites. While this is likely not the sole reason a family lives on the plot, 
there is a relational connectedness there that cannot be overlooked. Never should a plan be 
implemented for a site such as this one without heeding the opinions and suggestions from 
residents. This can happen only after sufficient time and effort has been put in to better 
understand the needs, wants, and social dynamics of such as place as COD.  
Today’s planners must account for the “diverse kinds of ways of knowing that exist apart 
from technical knowledge” (Ameel, 2017, p.219). Treating narrative of place as a legitimate way 
of knowing could transform the way planners go about plan implementation. To take that a step 
further, what if the profession of planning, instead of focusing on the dominant narrative of 
place, focused on a non-dominate narrative? For the City of the Dead, the unconventional 
solution proposed here could be the result of that.  
Narrative and Power  
“Narrative thinking helps us understand how past events led to past outcomes and helps 
us imagine what actions to carry out to achieve future ends” (Kim, 2015, p. 156). This idea is 
certainly true for the City of the Dead and potential planning outcomes. So how do particular 
narratives of the City of the Dead affect the current occupation and the future planning 
surrounding this place? The overall findings for this work are that the dominant narrative about 
the City of the Dead imagines it to be a cemetery and not a residential settlement. This is 
evident in the plans and policies regarding the site as well as in the terminology used to 
describe those who live in COD. The most powerful interests have the power to determine the 
dominant narrative about a place and shape other people’s narratives in the process. The most 
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powerful interests shape which interpretation of fact prevails. Ultimately, this means knowledge 
for the common man is shaped by powerful interests (Forester, 1982). Power effects both 
spatial and social outcomes by affecting knowledge. Powerful interests in Cairo do not call COD 
an informal housing settlement because that would require treating it as such. Meaning, the 
state and government would become responsible for making it more inhabitable than it currently 
is. Powerful interests are narrowing their responsibilities for COD by changing the knowledge, or 
narrative, of this site. Flyvbjerg articulates this well by saying, “power often ignores or designs 
knowledge at its convenience” (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p.355). Planners must figure out the 
phenomenon that allows powerful figures and entities to shape knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2002). 
Planners cannot ignore power, nor can they wish it away (Forester, 1982). Instead, planners 
should unpack and understand existing power structures so that power imbalances affecting 
COD might be reduced. Anna Tozzi Di Marco says it best: The City of the Dead is a “living 
culture” (p. 48), and it must be treated as such.  
Ideas for Future Study  
There are innumerable unanswered questions about informal settlements in the Greater 
Cairo Region, and they merit explanation. Each section of this literature review and analysis 
could be explored further. The following is a brief list of questions to ponder related to this work: 
1. How can the state make housing more affordable? This question would require 
interdisciplinary exploration.  
2. How might the already built (but still vacant) housing on the periphery of Cairo be made 
available for low-income residents?  
3. How can the definition of informal settlements in the Egyptian context be better suited to 
realistically and honestly address the needs of the current housing stock, particularly in 
the Greater Cairo Region?  
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Appendix A - Interview Questions  
The embedded/ historical narratives  
•Can you tell me the history of the City of the Dead? 
 
•Why do people live in the City of the Dead today? 
 
•In what ways do you value the historical qualities in the City of the Dead? Such 
as important tombs, the citadel, etc.  
 
Daily narratives 
•How is the City of the Dead, specifically the makaber area, different from other 
informal settlements?  
 
•What do residents of the City of the Dead not understand about the City of the 
Dead? 
 
•How does the City of the Dead affect how outsiders perceive the city of Cairo?  
 
Future narrative  
•How are planners addressing the City of the Dead?  
 
•How likely is it that the tombs will be demolished? If so, how long might that 
take?  
 
•What do you hope the City of the Dead looks like in 5 years? 
 
•What do you hope the City of the Dead looks like in 30 years?  
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  الحكوميون المسؤولون - الأسئله هيكل 
 
   التاريخية الروايات 
   المقابر؟ منطقة بتاريخ تخبرني أن  يمكن هل
   اليوم؟ المقابر في الناس  يعيش  لماذا 
  ذلك  إلى  وما  والقلعة المهمة المقابر مثل المقابر؟ في التاريخية والقيم للصفات  تقديرك مدى ما
 
  اليومية  الروايات 
  الرسمية؟  غير المستوطنات من  غيرها عن ،)..............( منطقة وتحديدا   تختلف، كيف
  منطقتهم؟ عن  المقابر سكان  يفهمه  ل  الذي ما
  القاهرة؟  لمدينة الزائرين ورؤية  تصور على المقابر تؤثر كيف
 
  المستقبل سرد
   المقابر؟  منطقة المخططون يتعامل كيف
  ذلك؟ يستغرق قد الوقت من كم ، كذلك الأمر كان إذا المقابر؟  هدم احتمال مدى ما
  اعوام؟  5 خلال الموتى مدينة عليه تبدو أن تأمل الذي ما
  عام  ا؟  03 خلال الموتى مدينة عليه تبدو أن تأمل الذي ما
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Appendix C - Research Consent Form  
Informal Housing in Cairo: Unpacking the narrative of the tomb communities 
The purpose of this study is to conduct research about the City of the Dead. Participants will be 
asked a series of questions in order to understand the story behind the tomb communities. 
Questions about what it is like to live there and the history of the area will be asked.   
All interview questions you answer will be video recorded for reference during my research 
process and eventually transcribed into paper format. Photos and videos will be used for the 
report, but your face will not be recognizable. All records will be kept on my secured computer 
system with access only by the research team. The answers and advice you provide will be 
summarized into a set of policy recommendations published in a report that will be available for 
reference for other researchers interested in Cairo’s urbanism. However, no names or contact 
information you provide will be released or published and will be kept in strict confidentiality 
between my research team, you, and myself unless otherwise requested by you.  
You may feel uncomfortable talking to an outsider about your community. Your community 
members may not understand why you chose to participate in my research. 
However, the benefit to you participating in this study is that you can help others understand 
your narrative of the City of the Dead. This helps planners and outsiders know how they should 
view this area. Decisions are often based on the narrative, or story, that surrounds an area. 
Your viewpoint, experiences, and opinions matter.  
If you have questions about your rights as an interviewee or questions about the final research 
report please contact Susmita Rishi, Professor at Kansas State University via email: 
srishi@ksu.edu or phone 785-532-5961. You may also contact the Institutional Review Board at 
Kansas State via email: comply@k-state.edu or phone 785-532-3224.  
Additionally, if you have questions or wish to discuss on any aspect of the research with an 
official of the university or the Institutional Review Board, you may contact Rick Scheidt, Chair, 
Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects, 203 Fairchild Hall, Kansas State University, 
Manhattan, KS 66506, 785- 532-3224. 
 
Researchers: Susmita Rishi & Lindsey Logan 
Please read the following points and sign below if you agree: 
 
1. I understand that the purpose of this study and that an interview will be conducted. The 
interview will last approximately 1 hour. 
2. I understand that my participation will remain anonymous. I understand I will not be named in 
any written work arising from this study. I understand my face will not be shown in the final 
product of this study. 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary, and I am free to withdraw at any time without 
giving any reason. I will not be penalized for doing this.  
4. I agree to take part in this study. I acknowledge that I will be asked a series of questions 
about my community, and they will be translated from English to Arabic and vice versa. The 
conversation will be filmed and recorded.  
 
Name:  
Date: 
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 القاهرة فى الرسمى غير  الإسكان في العليا الدراسات بحث
 المقابر  مجتمعات قصة تفريغ
 
 
 أجل من الأسئلة من سلسلة على الإجابة منك سيُطلب .القاهرة في المقابر  منطقة حول بحث إجراء هو الدراسة هذه من الغرض
 .هناك العيش يعنيه وما المنطقة تاريخ حول أسئلة طرح سيتم .المقابر  مجتمعات وراء القصة فهم
 وثيقة إلى النهاية في تفريغها سيتم ثم البحث عملية أثناء كمرجع عليها ستجيب التي المقابلة أسئلة لجميع فيديو تسجيل سيتم
 بي الخاص الآمن الكمبيوتر  نظام على السجلات بجميع الاحتفاظ سيتم .للتقرير  الفيديو ومقاطع الصور  استخدام سيتم .مكتوبة
 .البحث فريق قبل من فقط الوصول مع
 تقرير  في نشرها سيتم والتي العامة بالسياسة المتعلقة التوصيات من مجموعة الى تقدمها التي والنصائح الإجابات تلخيص سيتم
 تقدمها اتصال معلومات أو أسماء أي نشر يتم لن ، ذلك ومع .القاهرة في بالعمران مهتمين آخرين لباحثين كمرجع متاًحا سيكون
 .ذلك خلاف أنت تطلب لم ما فقط لك نسخة مع الجامعة في بي الخاص البحث فريق مع تامة سرية في بها الاحتفاظ وسيتم ،
 في المشاركة اختيارك سبب مجتمعك أفراد يفهم لا قد .مجتمعك عن غريب شخص إلى التحدث عند الارتياح بعدم تشعر  قد
 يساعد مما المقابر  سكان قصة فهم على الآخرين مساعدة يمكنك أنه هو الدراسة هذه في المشاركة من لك الفائدة .بحثي
 بالمنطقة، تحيط التي القصة إلى القرارات تستند ما غالبًا .المنطقة هذه بخصوص رؤيتهم صياغة على والباحثين المخططين
 .مهمة والآراء والخبرات نظرك وجهة كذلك
 الأستاذة ريشي سوسميتا بـ الاتصال فيرجى ، النهائي البحث تقرير حول أسئلة أو كمحاور  حقوقك حول أسئلة لديك كانت إذا
 أيًضا يمكنك  ١٦٩٥٢٣٥٥٨٧١٠٠ التليفون عبر  أو :ude.usk@ihsirs الإلكتروني البريد عبر  كانساس ولاية بجامعة
 التليفون عبر  أو : k@ylpmoc-ude.etats الإلكتروني البريد عبر  كانساس ولاية في المؤسسية المراجعة بلجنة الاتصال
 التليفون عبر - البشر  تشمل التي البحوث لجنة رئيس  شيدت ريك الاتصال أيضا يمكنك ٤٢٢٣٢٣٥٥٨٧١٠٠
  إلى الكتابة يرجى أو  .٤٢٢٣٢٣٥٥٨٧١٠٠
 60566 ,SK ,nattahnaM ,ytisrevinU etatS sasnaK ,llaH dlihcriaF 302
 
 لوغان وليندسي ريشي سوسميتا :الباحثتان
  
 أدناه  والتوقيع التالية النقاط بقراءة التكرم الرجاء
 
 .واحدة ساعة حوالي تستمر  سوف مقابلة إجراء سيتم وأنه الدراسة هذه من الغرض أفهم أنني أؤكد   )١
 أن أفهم .الدراسة هذه بخصوص مكتوب عمل أي في اسمي ذكر يتم لن أنه أفهم .مجهولة ستبقى مشاركتي أن أفهم   )٢
 .الدراسة لهذه النهائي المنتج في يظهر لن وجهي
 .ذلك على أعاقب لن .سبب أي إبداء دون وقت أي في الانسحاب في حر وأنا ، طوعية مشاركتي أن أفهم   )٣
 من ترجمتها وسيتم ، مجتمعي حول الأسئلة من سلسلة طرح سيتم بأنه أقر  .الدراسة هذه في المشاركة على أوافق   )٤
    .وتسجيلها المحادثة تصوير  سيتم .والعكس العربية إلى الإنجليزية
 
     :الاسم
 _   :التاريخ
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